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Abstract
This Note analyzes current international regulations for the deliberate release of genetically
modified organisms into the environment. Part I describes the benefits and risks associated with
the introduction of GMOs into the environment and presents an overview of deliberate release reg-
ulations in various countries to show the range of standards in individual nations. Part II analyzes
international multilateral efforts to regulate the deliberate release of GMOs. Part III critiques cur-
rent international efforts to regulate deliberate releases and proposes harmonization of deliberate
release regulations through an international body that would approve these releases upon proof of
safety of the proposed release into the environment. This Note concludes that an international set
of regulations for the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment is needed to facilitate trade
and to protect the environment.
OUT OF THE LAB AND INTO THE FIELD:
HARMONIZATION OF DELIBERATE RELEASE
REGULATIONS FOR GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS*
INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology has the potential to revolutionize both in-
dustrial and agrarian economies.' Genetic engineering has
produced bacteria capable of digesting petroleum,2 viruses
that act as' insecticides,' pest-resistant crops,4 and tomatoes
that will stay firm for weeks on the shelf.5 To develop such
technologically advanced products, genetically modified orga-
nisms ("GMOs") must be used outside of the laboratory and
tested in the field.6 The introduction of GMOs into the envi-
* The author wishes to thank John H. Barton, George E. Osborne Professor of
Law at Stanford Law School for his encouragement and guidance in the preparation
of this Note.
1. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY 29 (199 1) [hereinafter OTA] (discussing biotechnology's poten-
tial); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA-ENGI-
NEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT: KEY ISSUES 8 (1987) [hereinafter INTRO-
DUCTION OF RDNA] (stating that biotechnology offers exciting opportunities for the
development of products in medicine, industry, agriculture, and environmental man-
agement); Thomas 0. McGarity, International Regulation of Deliberate Release Biotechnolo-
gies, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 423, 424 (1991) (discussing biotechnology's potential).
2. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S 303 (1980) (granting patent to
petroleum digesting bacteria).
3. See Jiirg Huber, Safety of Baculoviruses Used as Biological Insecticides, in RISK As-
SESSMENT FOR DELIBERATE RELEASES 65 (Walter Klingmiiller ed., 1988) [hereinafter
RISK ASSESSMENT].
4. See Laura Shapiro, A Mystery in Your Lunchbox, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1992, at 48,
49. Bacillus thuringiensis, or BT,'is a bacterium that is toxic to certain insects, but
harmless when digested by humans. Id. The gene for BT can be transferred into
plant cells to create new plants that are able to produce their own insecticide. Id.
Monsanto, a U.S. chemical company, expects to introduce a new type of cotton that is
resistant to the cotton bollworm, as well as a potato that kills the Colorado potato
beetle. Id.
5. Id. at 48. Calgene Inc., a food manufacturer, is planning to introduce a ge-
netically engineered tomato, the Flavr Savr, that resists rotting for more than three
weeks. Id.; see Michael Schrage, Genetically Engineered Foods May be Safe, but They Still
Should be Labeled, WASH. POST, June 5, 1992, at BI 1.
6. See M. CHIARA MANTEGAZZINI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS FROM BIOTECHNOL-
OGY 67 (1986). Field testing of genetically modified plants is necessary because many
plants respond differently in. greenhouse or chamber testing than they do in field
conditions. Id.; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL ERA FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 183 (1992) [hereinafter NEW TECHNO-
LOGICAL ERA] ("Greenhouse experiment, conducted in facilities designed to meet
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ronment is commonly known as the "deliberate release" or
"planned introduction" of genetically modified organisms into
the environment. 7 The deliberate release of GMOs has given
rise to intense debate about the possible risks to human health
and the environment.' Research, however, has not focused on
safety concerns. 9
Regulators in individual nations, faced with the contro-
versy surrounding the deliberate release of GMOs have re-
sponded with different policies.' 0 Some nations have very
stringent laws prohibiting deliberate releases while other na-
tions have left this area unregulated." Various international
agreements have attempted to harmonize deliberate release
regulations, but most of these efforts have resulted either in
broad recommendations that fail to offer specific guidelines to
the biotechnology industry or regulations with limited regional
applications. 12
containment specifications, can provide only an initial screening; the field trial is an
essential evaluative step.").
7. INTRODUCTION OF RDNA, supra note 1, at 8.
8. See EC "Stocktaking" on Biotechnology, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, Oct. 30, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. Environmentalists remain unsure about
the ecological impact of biotechnology. Id. Consumers are demanding clear and
objective information about biotechnology. Id.
9. See OTA, supra note 1, at 129 (noting that "research and product develop-
ment in the environmental sectors are minuscule compared to more commercially
lucrative sectors influenced by biotechnology and international activity to date is lim-
ited"); Martin Brown, Science Technology and the Environment, OECD OBSERVER, Feb-
Mar., 1992, at 11 ("Although OECD governments have come to set a considerably
larger role for research and development in their emerging environmental policies
... this shift of views has so far not been fully reflected in the financing of environ-
mental research and development ["R&D"]"); German Law Endangering Biotech?, Bi-
OTECH. Bus. NEWS, July 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File
(stating that German parliament was told that there were now -virtually no environ-
mental studies on GMOs).
10. JEFFREY N. GIBBS, ET. AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY & THE ENVIRONMENT: INTERNA-
TIONAL REGULATION 271 (1987) [hereinafter GIBBS].
11. Id. at 271 (discussing deliberate release regulations in individual countries).
12. See Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. l (1993) [hereinafter Agenda 21 ] (containing
non-binding recommendations); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,
U.N. Doc. DPI/130 7 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 818 (1992) [hereinafter Bi-
odiversity Treaty] (lacking specific guidance for regulating deliberate releases of
GMOs); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY (OECD 1992) [hereinafter 1992 REPORT] (lim-
ited to members of the OECD); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, RECOMBINANT DNA SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS-SAFETY CONSIDERA-
TIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL APPLICATIONS OF ORGA-
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Harmonization of international regulations for the delib-
erate release of GMOs into the environment is needed to en-
courage the development of genetically engineered products,
to promote international trade, and to protect human health
and the environment with common safety standards.' 3
Although geographic and policy differences among nations are
obstacles to harmonization, international regulations for the
deliberate release of GMOs are possible. 4 Current interna-
tional agreements, despite their limitations, show that a signifi-
cant amount of co-operation between individual nations and
international bodies already exists.' 5
This Note analyzes current international regulations for
the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into
the environment. Part I describes the benefits and risks associ-
ated with the introduction of GMOs into the environment and
presents an overview of deliberate release regulations in vari-
ous countries to show the range of standards in individual na-
tions. Part II analyzes international multilateral efforts to reg-
ulate the deliberate release of GMOs. Part III critiques current
international efforts to regulate deliberate releases and pro-
poses harmonization of deliberate release regulations through
an international body that would approve these releases upon
proof of safety of the proposed release into the environment.
This Note concludes that an international set of regulations for
the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment is needed
to facilitate trade and to protect the environment.
NISMS DERIVED BY RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNIQUES (OECD 1986) [hereinafter 1986
REPORT] (limited to members of the OECD); Council Directive No. 90/220, 1990
O.J. (L 117) (limited to European region).
13. See BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE SCIENCE AND THE BUSINESS 113 (Vivian Moses et
al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Moses] (arguing that international harmonization will lead
to common safety standards and maintain free trade); Peter Aldhous, Regulation cost
concerns, 354 NATURE 5, (Nov. 1991) (quoting representative of U.K.'s Biolndustry
Association expressing desire for consistent approach to regulation costs throughout
EC).
14. GIBBS, supra note 10, at 274.
15. See NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 205 (stating that U.S. regula-
tions harmonize with OECD recommendations); ROBERT T. YUAN & MARK D. DIBNER,
JAPANESE BIOTECHNOLOGY, 4, 48 (1990) (commenting on effort by Japanese regula-
tors to conform with OECD recommendations) [hereinafter JAPANESE BIOTECHNOL-
OGY]; Economic Commission's Work Programme for 1990, EUR. REP. Jan. 27, 1990 at § 313,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (noting that EC has participated in in-
ternational forums involving environment as well as in international negotiations).
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I. APPLICATIONS, HAZARDS, AND REGULATION OF
DELIBERATE RELEASES
Some of the latest biotechnology applications necessitate
the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment.' 6 The
public, however, views genetically modified organisms as
harmful and opposes governmental policies that are designed
to encourage the biotechnology industry.' 7 Public interest
groups opposed to genetic manipulation include political and
religious groups." Genetic activist groups in the United States
have used litigation and other means of pressure to halt the
large-scale release of GMOs into the environment. 9 The pub-
lic's fears of the potential hazards of deliberate releases, as well
as the scientific controversy over the safety of deliberate re-
leases, has slowed the field testing of GMOs.2 ° Confronted
with public opposition and the absence of a full scientific con-
sensus on the relative safety and risks of introducing modified
organisms into the environment, regulators in some nations
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining need for field testing and
deliberate releases of GMO products into environment),
17. See APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLICY ISSUES 27
(John R. Fowle III ed., 1987) [hereinafter APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY]. The
public's concerns include the fear of potential risks of laboratory hazards, ethical con-
cerns over the manipulation of human genes, anxiety over the development of bio-
logical weapons, and the potential for adverse effects on humans and the biosphere
from releases of GMOs into the environment. Id.; EFB's Research Budget Worries, BI-
OTECH. Bus. NEWS, July 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File
(stating that members of European Federation of Biotechnology consider public
fears about safety of genetic engineering one of major barriers to biotechnology).
18. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 735 (D.D.C.
1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Foundation
on Economic Trends in Washington D.C. opposes the marketing of any genetically
engineered foods. Id.; New Catechism for Catholics Defines Sins of Modern World, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1992, at Al (reporting that Catholic Church's new catechism consid-
ers genetic engineering of human embryos sinful). Europe's Green party opposes
genetic manipulations as part of its political platform. OTA, supra note 1, at 187.
19. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143; Lawrence M.
Fisher, Tomato Gene Is Submitted For Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at D4 [hereinaf-
ter Tomato Gene] (citing recent example of consumer advocates successfully exerting
pressure on GMO product). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's ruling in May
1992 that found that genetically engineered foods do not require special approval or
labelling resulted in a storm of protest, including a petition signed by 1500 chefs
across the country, and a threatened boycott of engineered foods. Id. Because of the
public's reaction, Calgene, Inc. decided to ask the Food and Drug Administration to
approve its genetically modified tomato, the Flavr Savr, as a food additive. Id.
20. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGA-
NISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 7 (1989) [hereinafter FIELD TESTING].
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have responded with a wide range of deliberate release regula-
tions. Other nations, however, have chosen to leave the area
of deliberate releases of GMOs unregulated.2 '
A. Applications Requiring Deliberate Releases
Biotechnology has been defined as "the industrial use of
recombinant DNA ["rDNA"],2 2 cell fusion, and novel bi-
oprocessing techniques. '23 These genetic manipulation tech-
niques are commonly referred to as genetic engineering.24 In
1990 alone, the U.S. government spent more than US$3.4 bil-
lion to support research and development in biotechnology-
related areas.2 5 The financial markets also have embraced bio-
technology because of its potential for creating extremely prof-
itable products. 6 Proponents of biotechnology believe that it
will deliver many benefits to the agricultural, pharmaceutical,
and chemical industries. 7
21. See OTA, supra note 1, at 189-92 (discussing nations with no regulations for
biotechnology).
22. See INTRODUCTION OF RDNA, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining rDNA technol-
ogy). RDNA techniques produce hybrid DNA by joining pieces of DNA from differ-
ent organisms. Id.
23. See OTA, supra note 1, at 29. The Office of Technological Assessment of the
U.S. Congress uses the term biotechnology to refer to novel bioprocessing tech-
niques rather than the traditional definition of biotechnology that included tradi-
tional fermentation and breeding techniques. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2)(B) (1988
& Supp. III 1991) (referring to products "primarily manufactured using recombinant
DNA, recombinant RNA, hydridoma technology, or other process involving site-spe-
cific genetic manipulation techniques").
24. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (1986).
25. OTA, supra note 1, at 19.
26. See id. at 8-12 (discussing financing of biotechnology). The pharmaceutical
industry's use of biotechnology to produce high value-added products is particularly
attractive to investors such as venture capitalists. Id. at 11. For example, one dose of
Genetic's tissue plasmogen activator may cost U.S.$2200.00. Id.
27. See id. at 73-96 (pharmaceutical), 99-115 (agricultural), 119-25 (chemical).
For example, dairy farmers can control the sex of calves through biotechnological
techniques. Id. at 100. Human estrogen receptor and insulin-like growth factor
have been transferred to cattle in attempts to produce faster growing animals. Id. at
102; see FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 77-80; Salomon Wald, The Biotechnological
Revolution, OECD OBSERVER, Feb. 1989, at 16.
Agriculture... will be transformed by biotechnology, which has the poten-
tial to boost food production substantially, both through increasing crop
growth rates and improving the growth efficiency of livestock, and to reduce
residues from pesticides and other agro-chemicals .... [T]he next decade
will see enormous advances in the development of plants and trees - not
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In agriculture, genetically modified rhizobium, a bacte-
rium, has been used extensively to improve the yield of certain
crops.2 8 Industrial processes that use genetically modified mi-
croorganisms include microbial enhanced oil recovery, which
uses GMOs to improve the efficiency of oil production from
reservoirs, 29 and bioleaching, which uses GMOs to extract
metals from ores.3 ° Genetically modified organisms also have
environmental applications .31 Genetically engineered bacteria
can degrade environmental pollutants and cleanse industrial
and municipal waste streams.3 2 These agricultural and envi-
ronmental applications require the intentional release of ge-
netically modified organisms into the environment to test the
new organisms' effectiveness under actual conditions, rather
least, maize, wheat and rice - that offer high growth rates and improved
seed qualities, and tolerate salt or stress.
Id.
Opponents of biotechnology claim that despite its many benefits, there may also
be some potential dangers in the new biotechnologies. Letter from Rebecca
Goldberg, Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense Fund, to Dr. David Kessler, Com-
missioner, FDA (Oct. 1, 1991) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
Twenty-seven deaths and over 1500 serious illnesses have been attributed to L-tryp-
tophan manufactured from genetically engineered bacteria. Id. at v. The L-trypto-
phan never received FDA review because "dietary supplements" do not need FDA
approval before they are marketed. Id. The exact cause'of the supplement's toxicity,
including whether it is related to genetic engineering, remains unclear. Id. at 6.
28. FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 80; P.R. Hirsch & J.R. Spokes, Rhizobium
Leguminosaurum as a Model for Investigating Gene Transfer in Soil, in RIsK ASSESSMEr,
supra note 3, at 10-12. Genetically modified rhizobium is a nitrogen fixing bacteria
that can increase the agricultural yield of legume crops. Id. at 12.
29. See Moses, supra note 13, at 537 (discussing microbial enhanced oil recov-
ery).
30. See id. at 567 (discussing bioleaching); FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 82
(noting that genetically engineered microorganisms are used to enhance recovery of
gold from ores); OTA, supra note 1, at 131 (noting use of genetically modified bacte-
ria to extract uranium).
31. OTA, supra note 1, at 129-41. Genetically engineered bacteria degraded
substituted benzoates presented in industrial sludge. See FIELD TESTING, supra note
20, at 80-81 (discussing use of microorganisms to treat waste); D.F. Dwyer et al. Bac-
teria with New Pathways for the Degradation of Pollutants and their Fate in Model Ecosystems,
in RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 100 (discussing use of bacteria to cleanse waste
streams).
32. Dwyer, supra note 31, at 100. Genetically engineered bacteria survived
within a model aerobic sludge ecosystem and were able to degrade chlorinated and
methylated benzoic acids that were present in ordinarily inhibitory combinations.
Id.; see FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 80-81 (discussing use.of genetically modified
microorganisms in waste treatment); Richard J.F. Brewly et. al., Waste Treatment and
Pollution Clean-up, in MosEs, supra note 13, at 507-09 (discussing use of genetically
modified microorganisms in waste treatment).
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than in laboratory simulations.3
B. Potential Hazards of Deliberate Releases
While the potential and actual benefits of releasing GMOs
into the environment are widely acknowledged, there is con-
troversy over the possible adverse effects of such releases.3 4
Legitimate concerns exist about the biological and ecological
consequences of introducing new or altered organisms into the
environment on a large scale.35 The greatest source of appre-
hension among ecologists is the potential hazards of introduc-
ing non-native organisms into a new environment. 36 For ex-
ample, the introduction of a non-native or "exotic ' 37 species
into a new environment sometimes results in the new exotic
33. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining need for field testing and
deliberate release of GMOs into environment).
34. Compare Martin Alexander, Spread of Organisms with Novel Genotypes, BIOTECH-
NOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RISK AND REGULATION 123-26 (Albert H. Teich et al.
eds., 1985) (analogizing possible effect of deliberate release of GMOs to deleterious
effect of infectious disease on human populations with no resistance) with INTRoDuc-
TION OF RDNA, supra note 1, at 8 ("Crops modified by molecular and cellular meth-
ods should pose no risks different from those modified by classical genetic methods
for similar traits.") and Charles S. Gasser & Robert T. Fraley, Transgenic Crops, ScI.
AM., June 1992, at 62 ("Although genetic engineering is more complex than tradi-
tional plant-breeding practices, it is just as safe.") and Simon A. Levin & Mark Har-
well, Environmental Risks and Genetically Engineered Organisms, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 56, 66 (Sandra Panen ed., 1985) (arguing that GMOs
are not fundamentally new and different) and Proposals for Council Directives,
COM(88) 160 final at 25 (stating that "intense debate" exists about possible risk of
deliberate releases).
35. See STAFF OF HousE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT HOUSE
COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 16 (Comm. Print 1984) (listing
ecological disruptions, infectivity, pathogenity, or toxicity to nontarget organisms
and exchange of genetic material with other organisms as potential dangers of delib-
erate releases); MANTEGAZZINI, supra note 6, at 65 ("Direct or indirect changes may
affect the environment when deliberate or accidental release of micro-organisms
takes place."); James M. Tiedje et al., The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered
Organisms: Ecological Considerations and Recommendations, 70 ECOLOGY 298 (1989) (ad-
dressing scientific issues in introduction of GMOs into environment).
36. Bernard D. Davis, Bacterial Domestication; Underlying Assumptions, 235 ScI. 1329
(1987).
37. See FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 39 (defining "exotic species"). Exotic
species refers to entirely novel species in new habitats. Id. Exotic species may not be
strictly analogous to genetically modified organisms because many exotic species dif-
fer by many traits while genetically modified plants that are likely to be introduced
will differ by only one or a few traits from cultivated forms already in the environ-
ment. Id.
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species displacing the native varieties and dominating the envi-
ronment.38 A small fraction of introductions of non-native or-
ganisms have caused major ecological disturbances. 39  Even
though a naturally occurring exotic species is not directly
analogous to GMOs, small genetic alterations may neverthe-
less create ecologically important changes.4 0 Thus, GMOs in-
troduced into new environments may also have ecological im-
pacts similar to those of exotic species.4
Genetically engineered microorganisms, once released
into the natural environment, theoretically may have a good
chance to survive, multiply, and exchange genetic material, or
hybridize, with other microorganisms in the environment.42
38. See APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 95 (discussing risk of
deliberate releases). Introduced species become problems when they are put into
new environments that lack the pests, predators,. and other controls that check
growth in their native homes. Id.; see INTRODUCTION OF RDNA, supra note 1, at 19
(discussing introduction of non-native species as risk of deliberate releases).
39. APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 93; FIELD TESTING, supra
note 20, at 39-40 (discussing ecological implications of introducing plants with many
new traits).
40. See FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 39. Exotic species may not be strictly
analogous to genetically modified organisms because many exotic species differ
vastly from their neighbors in the new environment. Id. Genetically modified plants
that are likely to be introduced in the near future will differ by only one or a few traits
from cultivated forms already in the environment. Id. at 40-41.
41. See Levin, supra note 34, at 68-70 (arguing difficulty of predicting ecological
consequences when gene from one species is inserted into another and resulting
modified organism released into environment); McGarity, supra note 1, at 425 (argu-
ing difficulty of predicting ecological consequences when gene from one species is
inserted into another and resulting modified organism released into environment);
see also APPLICATIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 96, 130, 134 (rejecting
exotic species model for case-by-case risk analysis); FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at
137 (discussing United States regulatory scheme). "[A] fundamental concern is
whether the limited current understanding of microbial ecology... enables the envi-
ronmental fate of released organisms to be predicted." Id. at 139 (citations omitted).
42. See Jan Dirk van Elsas, et al., Plasmid Transfer in Soil and Rhizosphere, in RISK
ASSESSMENT supra note 3, at 90 (conjugal gene transfer of plasmid encoding tetracy-
cline resistance between two soil-isolated bacilli in soil); Z. Filip, Some Ecological Aspects
of the Release of Nonresident Microorganisms in Soil and Groundwater Environments, in RISK
ASSESSMENT supra note 3, at 86 (finding that GMOs released into environment may
survive, multiply, and cause gene transfer). But see MANTEGAZZINI, supra note 6, at 32-
33. Genetic information may be exchanged in soil or water, but this information is
limited and usually comes from studies that were conducted under highly artificial
conditions. Id.; K. Doher & Walter Klingmiuller, Genetic Interaction of Rhizobium
Leguminsarum Biovar Viceae with Gram-Negative Bacteria, in RISK ASSESSMENT supra note
3, at 18 (finding gene transfer in lab, but not in field); P.R. Hirsh, Rhizobium Legumi-
nosarum as a Model for Investigating Gene Transfer in Soil, in RISK ASSESSMENT supra note
3, at 10 (finding that genetically modified bacteria may not survive well in field); see
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Such hybridization between genetically engineered organisms
and naturally occurring counterparts may create new
hazards.4 3 For example, wheat that has been genetically modi-
fied to resist pesticides may pass its pesticide-resistant gene on
to a weed, creating the risk of disrupting ecological cycles.4 4
While most scientists believe that the risks associated with the
introduction of a GMO are the same as those associated with
the introduction of naturally occurring non-native organisms
into the environment, some experts believe that other factors
can affect the risks of introducing GMOs into an environ-
ment.45
A genetically engineered microorganism will also spread
to the limits of its ecological niche, oblivious to international
boundaries. 46 For example, many fungal and some bacterial
also FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 43-53 (discussing genetic transfer); Alexander,
supra note 34, at 139. "Even adequate [testing of GMOs before their release into the
environment] will not prevent the organisms from picking up a harmful trait in the
environment or from manifesting an unforeseen trait once they find an ecological
niche." Id.
43. See APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 99-124 (discussing
infectious spread of engineered genes); Huber, supra note 3, at 69 ("A major concern
is the potential risk of transfer and exchange of genetically engineered characteristics
with naturally occurring microorganisms, or with the host or non-target organisms,
thereby creating new potential hazards.").
44. Biotechnology: Parliament calls for More Stringent Controls on Genetically Modified
Organisms, EUR. REP., Mar. 17, 1990, at 9. Cf Davis, supra note 36, at 1323 (discuss-
ing pesticide resistance and increase in drug resistance in bacteria).
45. See APPLICATIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 96, 130, 134 (stating
that instead of exotic species model, scientists should analyze risk involved in deliber-
ate release of GMOs on case-by-case basis); INrRODUCTION OF RDNA, supra note 1, at
6-7 (declaring that risk associated with introduction of GMOs are comparable to risk
associated with introduction of unmodified plants); Alexander, supra note 34, at 116-
27 (analyzing components of risk analysis in regard to deliberate release of GMOs);
Glasser & Fraley, supra note 34, at 62 (declaring genetically engineered plants safe);
Huber, supra note 3, at 69 (stating that potential hazards foreseen with genetically
engineered viruses are generally same as for non-engineered microbes); Levin, supra
note 34, at 68-70 (stating genetic engineering techniques are more efficient than
traditional breeding programs); see generally Davis, supra note 36 (proposing reliance
on principles from evolutionary biology, microbiology, and epidemiology rather than
exotic species model).
46. See APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 99-124 (discussing
infectious spread of engineered genes); Davis, supra note 36, at 1332 (noting that it is
not harmful effects of bacteria itself, but its capacity to multiply and spread that
causes concern); see also MANTEGAZZINI, supra note 6, at 45. In 1958, Peronospora
tabacina, tobacco blue mold, was imported into the United Kingdom for use in fungi-
cide experiments. Id. That year, the mold appeared on tobacco plants at three other
research institutes in England. Id. The following year, the mold appeared in the
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diseases can be spread by the airborne transport of spores.4"
Once released into the environment, the spread of a GMO can
be difficult to arrest.48 Because GMOs, when released, may
cross national borders, both the citizens and the environment
of one country can be affected by a deliberate release originat-
ing in another country, thereby creating an international con-
cern.
49
C. Deliberate Release Regulations in Individual Nations
Individual countries have responded in different ways to
the problem of safeguarding the environment against possible
adverse effects from the deliberate release of GMOs into the
environment.50 Denmark and Germany, for example, have
tobacco fields of Belgium and the Netherlands. Id. Thereafter, the mold infected
tobacco fields spread all over Europe, advancing in Germany at the rate of 5-20 Km
per week. Id. Although the original source of the mold was a laboratory licensed by
the British Plant Authority, its safety handling procedures were not sufficient to con-
tain the tobacco blue mold from infecting crops. Id.
47. MANTEGAZZINI, supra note 6, at 46. Spores are unicellular reproductive bod-
ies. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1756 (2nd. ed. 1983).
48. See S. Molin et al., Biological Containment of Bacteria and Plasmids to be Released into
the Environment, RISK ASSESSMENT supra note 3, at 127 (proposing suicide gene); "Sui-
cide genes," which incorporate a cell killing function into genes and ensure that a
GMO will not be able to survive in the environment once it has performed its task,
may offer a method of biological containment. See US Researchers Report Marker Gene
Advances, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, March 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File. Concern about the potential hazards associated with the deliberate
release of GMOs into the environment may be lessened. Id. One method removes
marker genes from genetically modified plants to reduce the risk that unnecessary
markers can be transferred into the environment. Id. Another method proposes bio-
luminescence for detection of GMOS released into the environment. Id.
49. See James T. O'Reilly, Biotechnology Meets Products Liability: Problems Beyond the
State of the Art, 24 Hous. L. REV. 451, 488 (1987) (recommending that liability be
defined by statute for drugs and other biotechnology products that cause personal
injury). See generally Sanford E. Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Environ-
mental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30 HARV.
INT'L. L.J. 311 (1989) (proposing strict liability for environmental harms caused by
their products, so that investors and managers can begin to make appropriate ar-
rangements to fund such potential liability).
50. See GIBBS, supra note 10, at 271. Most nations regulate deliberate releases at
the national level. Id. Contra OTA, supra note 1, at 229-42. In Australia, biotechnol-
ogy is regulated at the state level. Id. at 229. The federal government is developing
regulations for biotechnology. Id. Australia's Genetic Manipulation Advisory Com-
mittee, composed of university faculty, oversees all proposals for research and com-
mercial work involving genetic manipulation and planned releases of genetically
modified organisms. Id. at 230; see Rebecca Goldberg, Release of Genetically Engi-
neered Organisms: An International Concern 15 (Jan. 4, 1991) (paper presented to
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, on file with the Ford-
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created new laws to deal specifically with biotechnology, while
countries such as the United States have interpreted pre-ex-
isting laws to regulate the deliberate release of GMOs.5 ' The
newly enacted laws in Denmark and Germany follow a process-
oriented approach.5 2 Process-oriented regulations view the
technique of genetic engineering itself as a risk and regulate
the use of rDNA techniques, even if the end-product is not a
GMO. 3 In contrast, product-specific regulations are not con-
cerned with the use of biotechnology techniques, but with the
use of the GMO end-product, such as foods or pesticides. 4
Under the product-specific approach, GMO end-products are
regulated like similar products created by more traditional
techniques.5 5 In general, nations may be classified into three
categories: nations with process-oriented regulations, nations
with product-specific regulations, and nations with no regula-
tions for the deliberate release of GMOs.
1. Process-Oriented Deliberate Release Regulations
Denmark and Germany possess the most stringent laws re-
garding the release of genetically engineered organisms. 56 De-
spite strict regulation, these two countries have maintained
ham International Law Journal). Australia has permitted several field experiments that
have released genetically engineered organisms into the environment. Id.
51. GIBBS, supra note 10, at 272; Genetic Engineering; Bugs that Divide, ECONOMIST,
Jul) 28, 1990, at 57 [hereinafter Genetic Engineering) (comparing product-specific and
process-oriented regulation of biotechnology): Peter Newmark, Danish law to be less
rigid, 339 NATURE 653 (1989) (citing Danish Environment and Gene Technology Act
as specific legislation for gene experiments).
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing Danish and German
regulations for deliberate releases).
53. Id. (noting that new biotechnology laws of several European nations regard
technique of genetic engineering itself as risk).
54. Id.; see, e.g., Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51
Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986) (specifying U.S. regulatory approach as product-specific).
55. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (1986) (declaring U.S. regulatory policy for biotechnology); Genetic Engineer-
ing, supra note 51, at 57.
American regulators have decided that, with a few exceptions such as genet-
ically-engineered pharmaceuticals used to rectify human genetic diseases,
there is nothing especially dangerous about biotechnology products. No
new tests are required to prove their safety.
Id.; see GIBBs, supra note 10, at 272 (discussing product-oriented regulatory ap-
proach).
56. Newmark, supra note 51, at 653; see Michael Baiter, How Europe Regulates Its
Genes, 252 SCIENCE 1366 (1991) (stating that draconian measures were adopted in
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strong biotechnology industries."' Representatives of the bio-
technology industries in Denmark and Germany, however,
have expressed concern about their continued competitiveness
in an international forum when other countries are harmoniz-
ing their laws to foster trade.5
Denmark was the first European country to apply a pro-
cess-oriented approach and enact a law specifically for the reg-
ulation of biotechnology.5 9 The Environmental and Gene
Technology Act of 1986 resulted in a virtual prohibition of the
deliberate release of GMOs. 60 Although initially restrictive,
this act was modified in May 1989 to allow field testing of ge-
netically engineered sugar beets. 6' The stringency of Danish
laws for the release of GMOs led the Danish biotechnology in-
dustry to fear for its competitiveness in international mar-
kets.62 Perhaps in response to such industry concerns, the En-
vironmental and Gene Technology Act was further modified in
1991 to relax the requirements for field testing GMOs.65 This
modification provides for the deliberate release of GMOs with
approval procedures regulated by the Ministry of Environ-
ment.64
Germany, along with Denmark, possesses very stringent
deliberate release regulations, yet its domestic and pharmaceu-
tical industries rank among the most profitable in the world.65
Denmark and Germany partly due to pressure from Green Party and other environ-
mental activists).
57. See Newmark, supra note 51, at 653 (discussing status of Danish and German
biotechnology industries).
58. Id.
59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing Danish and German
regulations for deliberate releases).
60. Act No. 288 of 4 June 1986 on the Environment and Gene Technology
(Den.) (English trans. on file with The Fordham International Law Journal); see OTA,
supra note 1, at 233. Although Denmark is a member of the EC, Danish industries are
still bound by Danish laws regarding the regulation of biotechnology. Id.
61. See Moses, supra note 13, at 112 (discussing Danish deliberate release regula-
tions).
62. See OTA, supra note 1, at 233 (stating Danish industry has found law diffi-
cult).
63. Act No. 356 of 6 June 1991 on the Environment and Gene Technology
(Den.) (English trans. on file with The Fordham International Law Journal).
64. Telephone Interview with Dr. Victor Morgenroth, Principal Administrator,
OECD, Environmental Health and Safety Division, Paris, France (Apr. 5, 1993)
(notes on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
65. OTA, supra note 1, at 233.
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Despite the world prominence of its biotechnology industry,
Germany has faced opposition to biotechnology from popular
movements within the country.66 The strongest opposition to
the industry has come from the Green party, a German polit-
ical party that opposes the commercial use and public funding
of all genetic engineering. 67
Another obstacle to Germany's biotechnology industry
has come from its judiciary.68 In 1989, the Administrative
Court of Appeals in Hessen blocked the completion of a plant
to manufacture genetically engineered insulin.69 The court
held that express statutory basis for approval was required for
the construction permit for the plant. 70  However, since Ger-
man law did not expressly permit the application of genetic en-
gineering, the court ruled that such facilities may not be built
and operated. 71 This verdict was binding on all the states in
Germany.72
In response to this opposition to biotechnology, the Ger-
66. Id. at 234; see German Law Endangering Biotech?, supra note 9 (stating that lack
of public acceptance of genetic engineering is obstacle for German biotechnology
industry); Germany: Biotechnology Gets Go Ahead as New Legislation Comes Into Force, Reu-
ter Textline, Oct. 24, 1990 available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File [herein-
after Germany: Biotechnology] (stating that environmental pressure groups and Green
Party made it nearly impossible for companies to get approval for both genetic engi-
neering research projects and recombinant DNA products).
67. See Germany: Biotechnology, supra note 66; OTA, supra note 1, at 187. Opposi-
tion to genetic engineering is the Green Party's second political target, after opposi-
tion to nuclear power. Id. The Green Party platform calls for a total ban on biotech-
nology research, development, and production. Id. Until recently, Germany's Green
Party was the most successful Green Party in Europe, holding 46 seats in the German
National Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) until December 1990. Id. Although the
Green Party has been a potent force in the German National Parliament, it has re-
cently lost much of its momentum and is currently in chaos. Alex Beam, What Hap-
pened to the Greens?; After Startling Success in Germany, the Green Party has Disappeared, THE
GAZETrE, Mar. 23, 1992, at B3, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
68. See OTA, supra note 1, at 234 (discussing German court's decision to block
completion of genetic engineering plant); Claus-Joerg Ruetsch & Terry R. Broderick,
New Biotechnology Legislation in the European Community and Federal Republic of Germany, 18
INT'L. Bus. LAw. 408, 410 (1990) (discussing German court's decision to block com-
pletion of genetic engineering plant).
69. VGH Kassel, Beschl. v.6.11.1989 - 8 TH 685/89, in Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1990, Heft 5, at 336; see Ruetsch, supra note 68, at 18 (discussing Ger-
man court's ruling).
70. See Ruetsch, supra note 68, at 410 (discussing German court's ruling on ge-
netic engineering plant).
71. Id.
72. Id.; OTA, supra note 1, at 234.
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man National Parliament passed the process-oriented Genetic
Technology Law in 1990.13 The Genetic Technology Law per-
mits the release of genetically engineered organisms into the
environment with the approval of the Federal Health Authority
("Bundesgesundheitsamt").74 Approvals depend upon the safety
classification of the deliberate release.75 Safety classifications
range from levels 1 to 4, with level 1 offering no risk to human
health or the environment, and levels 2, 3, and 4 offering
slight, moderate, and high levels of risk, respectively. 76 Recog-
nizing that genetic technology retains a certain amount of risk,
this Act provides for civil liability of manufacturers and other
parties who create environmental risks up to DM160 million.7 7
In addition, this Act contains criminal and penalty provisions
to promote enforcement and to secure compliance with its
terms 78
The Genetic Technology Law contains a provision for
public hearings of objections. 79 In Cologne, over 16,000 ob-
jections were made in response to the Max-Delbruck Labora-
tory's plans to grow 10,000 genetically manipulated petunias
in an open field as part of a experiment.8 0 These lengthy pub-
lic hearings have slowed genetic research and development in
Germany. 8 ' Representatives of the German biotechnology in-
dustry claim that the current, strict regulations discourage the
development of the industry and cause research scientists to
73. Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der Gentechnik, 1990 BGBI. I 1080
(F.R.G.) [hereinafter Gentechnikgesetz); see Ruetsch, supra note 68, at 410 n. 15 (dis-
cussing Bundestag Drucksache 11/6778, 27 March 1990); Genetic Engineering, supra
note 51 (stating Germany has chosen process-oriented regulation of biotechnology);
Implementation of Biotechnology Rules Reassures Companies - Germany Leads the Way, Bus.
EUR., Apr. 24, 1992 available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (citing to
Gentechnik-Gesetz); see also Germany: Biotechnology, supra note 66 (responding to en-
vironmental pressure groups and Green party, German Bundestag passed Genetic
Technology law in 1990).
74. See Ruetsch, supra note 68, at 410. Approvals for deliberate releases must
granted or denied by the Federal Health Authority within three months of applica-
tion. Id.
75. Id.
76. Gentechnikgesetz, supra note 73, § 7, 1990 BGBI. I at 1083.
77. See Ruetsch, supra note 68, at 410.
78. Id. at 411.
79. See Implementation of Biotech Rules Reassures Companies, supra note 73 (discussing
public hearings in Germany over genetically engineered petunias).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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go abroad to countries with less severe restrictions.82 At least
one major German chemical manufacturer has moved its ge-
netic research laboratory to the United States, where the regu-
lations are less restrictive.85 In its stringent requirements, the
Genetic Technology Law reflects the impact of political pres-
sure exerted by public groups.8s The German public's distrust
of biotechnology probably will continue until scientific evi-
dence better establishes its safety."5
Like Germany, Japan also has a strong biotechnology in-
dustry with relatively stringent requirements for the deliberate
release of GMOs. In Japan, concern regarding the field testing
of genetically modified organisms is pervasive.86 The first field
test of a GMO in Japan, for a transgenic tomato, occurred in
1991.87 Japan is one of the world's leaders in biotechnology,
second only to the United States.88 The Japanese government
has identified biotechnology as one of the key technologies of
82. See German Law Endangering Biotech?, supra note 9 (quoting president of Ger-
man chemical industry association (VCI) stating, "The restrictive, bureaucratic and
overloaded enforcement of the [German Gene Technology] Act . . . is paralysing
development.")
83. See Richard L. Hudson, German Debate on Genes Stings Drug Makers, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 31 1989, at BI (stating that BASF plans to locate research labs in Boston);
Robert R. Bliss, BASF to Build Biotech Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990 (Real Estate),
at 21, (stating that BASF plans to build worldwide headquarters for biomedical re-
search and manufacturing center in Worcester, Massachusetts).
84. Ruetsch, supra note 68, at 410-11; see OTA, supra note 1, at 234. In other
European countries where there is no Green Party, such as the Netherlands, govern-
mental policies can favor industry. Id. at 236; Dutch Official Urges Global Approach to
Biotechnology Risk, Assessment Issues, INT'L ENVrL. DAILY (Oct. 16, 1991) (BNA), available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (quoting Dutch policymaker). Deliberate
releases are regulated by the April 1991 Decree on Genetically Modified Organisms,
under the Chemical Substances Act. Id. Under the decree, a new license must be
granted for each new activity involving the deliberate release of organisms into the
environment, in the form of engineered plants, insects, and animals. Id.
85. See German Law Endangering Biotech?, supra note 9 (stating that genetic engi-
neering has become linked in German public's mind with emotional issues like pre-
natal diagnostics, artificial insemination, and genome analysis); OTA, supra note 1, at
234 (discussing Germany's regulatory environment). To assuage the German pub-
lic's general safety concerns regarding genetic manipulation, the German govern-
ment plans to fund a new research program to assess the risk of biotechnology
through its Ministry for Research and Technology. Id.
86. OTA, supra note 1, at 20.
87. See NEw TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 207 (noting that field testing
of tomatoes engineered to resist tobacco mosaic virus by National Institute of Agro-
Environmental Science (NIAES)).
88. See OTA, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that Japan, rather than Europe, would
most likely be leading competitor of United States in biotechnology).
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the future, spending US$604 million on biotechnology in
1989.89 In Japan, the responsibility for regulating biotechnol-
ogy is divided among several ministries.' The Ministry of Ag-
riculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (the "MAFF") is responsible
for agricultural environmental protection. 9' The MAFF's
Guidelines for the Application of Recombinant DNA Organisms in Agri-
culture, Forestry, Fisheries, the Food Industry and Other Related Indus-
tries in Japan, published in 1989, are process-oriented regula-
tions that apply to the release of GMOs.92
In contrast to Denmark, Germany, and Japan, the United
Kingdom has been at the forefront of biotechnology regula-
tion.93 A number of field tests of GMOs have already occurred
in the United Kingdom.94 The Health and Safety at Work Act
of 1974 (the "1974 Act") was the first U.K. regulation for bio-
technology. 95 Under the 1974 Act, the Health and Safety
89. JAPANESE BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 15, at 1. Although the Japanese gov-
ernment spends only a fraction of the US$2.7 billion spent by the U.S. government in
1987, the Japanese government still spends more than any of the Western European
countries. Id. at 2.
90. See id. at 60-61. The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Culture
regulates basic research at universities. Id. The Science and Technology Agency
[hereinafter STA] regulates basic research in national laboratories and private indus-
try. Id. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fish [hereinafter MAFF] regulates
large-scale production of plants and animals. Id. The Ministry for Industrial Trade
and Industry [hereinafter MITI] regulates large-scale manufacture of specialty chemi-
cals. Id. MITI and the Environmental Protection Agency regulate waste treatment
together. Id. The Ministry of Welfare and Health regulates the large-scale produc-
tion of drugs. Id. MITI is the principal architect of Japanese biotechnology and de-
veloping biotechnology regulations that will forestall strong public opposition while
at the same time comply with the OECD recommendations. Id. at 4, 48. See OTA,
supra note 1, at 247. MITI oversees the "Guidelines for Industrial Application of
Recombinant DNA Technology." Id Introduced in 1986, these guidelines apply to
large-scale industrial processes and the containment of GMOs. Id.
91. See NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 206 (discussing Japanese reg-
ulations for biotechnology).
92. See Guidelines for the Application of Recombinant DNA Organisms in Agriculture, For-
estry, Fisheries, the Food Industry and Other Related Industries in Japan, ch. 3 § 1, translated
in JAPANESE BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 15, at 293 (stating regulation of deliberate
release of GMOs); see also id., ch. 2 § 1, at 287 (outlining fundamental principles of
safety evaluation for rDNA Organisms). As of 1990, the STA was in the process of
revising its guidelines to include the deliberate release of recombinant organisms.
Id. at 61.
93. See Moses, supra note 13, at 109 (comparing Great Britain's passing biotech-
nology regulations in 1978 with majority of other European countries which had
non-mandatory schemes until early 1980s).
94. Id.
95. The Health and Safety at Work, Etc Act, 1974, ch. 37 (Eng.), reprinted in 19
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Commission (the "HSC") has the primary role of protecting
health in the workplace while the Health and Safety Executive
(the "HSE") regulates the safety of industrial processes using
microorganisms and other biological processes. 96 The Advi-
sory Committee on Genetic Modification (the "ACGM") ad-
vises both the HSC and the HSE on the safety of proposed
activities involving GMOs.97
The 1974 Act was amended in 1989 to require notification
to the HSE and the ACGM before any planned releases.9" The
Environmental Protection Act of 1990, administered by the
Department of the Environment, now provides the basis for
protecting the environment from the deliberate release of
GMOs. 99 The new regulations are designed to comply with
the European Community (the "EC") directives on the delib-
erate releases of GMOs into the environment and are process-
oriented.' The HSC formed the Advisory Committee on Re-
lease to the Environment in 1990 to give advice on the safety
of proposed releases into the environment.' 01 The British
government estimates that the new regulations will cost com-
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 620-88 (4th ed. 1990); see GIBBS, supra
note 10, at 190 (discussing Health and Safety at Work, Etc Act).
96. GIBBS, supra note 10, at 190.
97. See OTA, supra note 1, at 193. The Advisory Committee on Genetic Modifi-
cation was formerly the Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation. Id.
98. Genetic Manipulation Regulations, S.I. 1989, No. 1810; see GIBBS, supra note
10, at 192 (discussing Genetic Manipulation Regulations); Moses, supra note 13, at
111 (discussing Genetic Manipulation Regulations).
99. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, pt. VI (Eng.), Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms, 1990, ch. 43 (Eng.); see Biotech Regulations Bite, PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFAC-
TURING REV., June 1991, at 18, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (re-
porting that Environmental Protection Act of 1990 was passed to comply with EC
directives on deliberate releases); UK: Department of the Environment - Proposals for
New Regulations on Genetically Modified Organisms, Reuter Textline, Aug. 18, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (reporting that Department of Environ-
ment and Health and Safety Commission have published proposals for new regula-
tions on safe use and handling of GMO); see also Proposal Would Carry Out EC Directives
on Handling, Use of Modified Organisms, INT'L ENVTL. Nov. 29, 1991 (BNA), available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (quoting U.K. government official stating that
Genetic Manipulations Regulations continue to protect human health and safety, but
they were not designed to protect environment).
100. See Aldhous, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing U.K.'s compliance with 1990
EC Directive for deliberate releases); Genetic Engineering, supra note 51, at 57 (discuss-
ing process-oriented regulations).
101. UK: Committee to Advise on Release of Genetically Modified Organisms Formed,
Reuter Textline, Apr. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File; see
Roger Highfield, Move to Allay Concern over Genetic Engineering, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan.
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panies and research institutions between £3 million and £10
million over the next five years. 0 2 Most of this money will be
generated from filing fees associated with deliberate release
applications for GMO market products and field tests. 0"
2. Product-Specific Deliberate Release Regulations
While Denmark, Germany, Japan, and the United King-
dom apply process-oriented approaches, passing new biotech-
nology laws to regulate deliberate releases, the United States
has chosen a product-specific approach, regulating GMOs with
pre-existing statutes.' °4 For example, in the United States, a
3, 1991, at 8 (reporting field testing of genetically modified oilseed rape plants ap-
proved by Advisory Committee for Release into Environment).
102. See Aldhous, supra note 13, at 5. Most consents for environmental releases
in the U.K. will cost between £2000 and £4000 under the new regulations. Id. Ger-
many and Denmark are proposing similar fees for deliberate release approvals. Id.
103. Id. (stating that Department of Environment plans to charge same fees to
academics as to industry).
104. See, e.g., Direct Food Substances Affirmed as Generally Recognized as Safe;
Chymosin Enzyme Preparation Derived From Escherichia L-12, 55 Fed. Reg. 10,932
(1990) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 184) (regulating genetically modified enzyme
as food additive); see FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 138 (describing process-ori-
ented approach); GIBBS, supra note 10, at 272 (describing product-specific approach);
Genetic Engineering, supra note 51 (comparing process oriented approach of EC with
product-specific regulatory approach of U.S.).
The use of pre-existing statutes by the United States to regulate biotechnology
has been criticized by commentators who point out that these statutes were originally
created to govern a class of products unrelated to bioengineered substances. Har-
rington, supra note 123, at 28; see ROBERT A. BoHRER, FROM RESEARCH TO REVOLU-
TION 119 (1985) ("TSCA is not a meaningful regulatory structure for environmental
releases"); Ruth E. Harlow, Note, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with
Scientifc Uncertainty, 95 YALE LJ. 553, 564 (1986) ("The current TSCA, as it applies to
biotechnology, establishes insufficient regulatory power and fails to prescribe ade-
quately the pre-release decisionmaking process."); see also Gary Marchant, Note, Mod-
ified Rules for Modified Bugs: Balancing Safety and Efficiency in the Regulation of Deliberate
Release of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms, 1 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 163, 164 (1988)
(discussing dissatisfaction with U.S. regulatory scheme for biotechnology).
Commentators have also criticized the U.S. multi-layered regulatory system for
its interagency conflicts, delays, and expenses. See Interagency Conflict and Administrative
Accountability: Regulating the Release of Recombinant Organisms, 77 GEo. L.J. 1787 (1989)
(discussing interagency conflict in U.S. regulatory structure for deliberate release of
GMOs); Harrington, supra note 123, at 28 ("jurisdictional overlap among various
federal agencies creates a bureaucratic logjam"); Peter W. Huber, Biotechnology and the
Regulation Hydra, 90 TECH. REV. 8, 57 (1987), available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File. "Effective regulatory approval can require a quiver of licenses" and
"delays of month and years are now common ... companies must invest large sums
in the early stages of developing a product to satisfy agency regulations." Id. But see
Declan Conroy, USDA Moves to Speed Up Bio-Ag Commercialization, FOOD & DRINK
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cheesemaking enzyme produced by genetically altered bacteria
is regulated as a food additive, like other enzymes under the
Food Additives Amendment. 0 5 The United States regulates
biotechnology at the federal level of government. 0 6 Although
several federal agencies now regulate biotechnology, for nearly
a decade, the National Institutes of Health (the "NIH") as-
sumed primary responsibility for the safety of genetic engi-
neering. 10 7
The NIH first developed guidelines for research involving
rDNA in 1976.108 These guidelines were designed to ensure
the safety of laboratory work and to prevent the accidental es-
cape of rDNA microorganisms. 109 The guidelines eventually
became binding on all institutions receiving any federal fund-
ing, in addition to those receiving NIH grants. 110 The influ-
ence of these guidelines has subsequently spread beyond fed-
erally funded research activities."' State and local govern-
ments, academic institutions, the industrial community, and
non-US countries have voluntarily either applied the NIH
guidelines or applied modified versions of them."12
Although experiments involving environmental introduc-
tions of GMOs were originally prohibited,' the NIH
DAILY, Nov. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. (discussing USDA
permitting procedures for field testing GMOs). The U.S. Department of Agriculture
[hereinafter USDA] is proposing a new system whereby small-scale field tests could
be conducted by notifying the Animal Plant Health and Inspection Service [hereinaf-
ter APHIS], without seeking a permit. Id.
Even the United States Office of Technological Assessment admits that the U.S.
regulatory system has been criticized as "too confusing." OTA, supra note 1, at 186.
105. See 55 Fed. Reg. 10,932 (1990), supra note 104 (granting FDA approval for
genetically engineered chymosin); see also OTA, supra note 1, at 107.
106. See generally Edward L. Korwek and Peter De La Cruz, Federal Regulation of
Environmental Releases of Genetically Manipulated Microorganisms, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. LJ. 301 (1985) (discussing federal regulation of GMOs).
107. APPLICATION Or BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 28.
108. See FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 134-35 (discussing National Institutes
of Health [hereinafter NIH] guidelines for genetic research).
109. Id. at 135.
110. Id. at 136.
111. Id.
112. APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 31. Although the NIH
had no legal jurisdiction over the research in private companies, firms were not will-
ing to risk the negative publicity that might arise if they violated the NIH guidelines.
Id. at 29. The few cases where violations of the guidelines were reported took place
at universities. Id.
113. FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 135.
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amended its guidelines in 1978 to permit the NIH director to
grant exceptions to the general prohibition on planned intro-
ductions of genetically manipulated organisms." 4 The first
two NIH approvals of field tests produced no significant public
reaction. 1 5 However, the third request for permission to field
test frost resistant bacterium became a public controversy, cul-
minating in a court challenge in 1984.'6
In 1986, the Office of Science Technology Policy issued a
policy statement called the Coordinated Framework for Regu-
lation of Biotechnology (the "Framework"). t'1 7 The Frame-
work divided jurisdiction over the environmental regulation of
biotechnology among several federal agencies." 18 The Frame-
work applies four general principles." l9 First, the Framework
114. Id. (stating that NIH guidelines were amended on the advice of Recombi-
nant Advisory Committee). The guidelines developed by the National Institute of
Health for the release of genetically modified organisms into the environment were
binding only on those who received government funding. APPLICATIONS OF BIOTECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 18, at 61. The private sector was encouraged to comply, but
there were no penalties for noncompliance. Id. at 61-62.
115. APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 35 (stating that geneti-
cally modified corn was subject of first request; genetically modified tomato and to-
bacco plants were subject of second request).
116. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 735 (D.D.C.
1984), affd in part and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Three public
interest groups, and two individuals successfully brought suit against the NIH, claim-
ing that permitting the field test to proceed without an environmental impact state-
ment would violate the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4331-
4335 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) ("NEPA"). Id. at 150-51. The D.C. Circuit court
affirmed a preliminary injunction to stay the field testing of genetically altered soil
bacterium on the grounds that the NIH had failed to comply with NEPA's environ-
mental impact statement requirement. Id. at 150; see 42 U.S.C § 4332(2)(c)(1988 &
Supp. III 1991); see also APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 17, at 42 (dis-
cussing Heckler); FIELD TESTING, supra note 21, at 136 (discussing Heckler); see generally
Kathryn Freistadt, Note, Environmental Review of Recombinant DNA Experiments Under
NEPA: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 501 (1987) (discuss-
ing Heckler).
117. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,301 (1986).
118. See id. (describing policies of Food and Drug Administration [hereinafter
FDA], Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA], Occupational Safety and
Health Administration [hereinafter OSHA], NIH, and USDA); Arthur Harrington &
Harlan A. Loeb, Agencies are Blinded by Science, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 7, 1992, at 23 (discuss-
ing U.S. regulation of biotechnology).
119. Moses, supra note 13, at 105; see generally David T. Bonk, FDA regulation of
Biotechnology, 43 FOOD DRUG Cos. L.J. 67 (1988).
1180 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1160
states that existing laws will regulate biotechnology. 0 Sec-
ond, it provides that the products of biotechnology, rather
than the process itself, will be regulated.' 2' Third, the safety
of a biotechnology product will be determined on an individ-
ual, or case-by-case, basis. l2 2  Last, it provides for a coordi-
nated effort among all the agencies involved in regulating bio-
technology.'2
The Framework gave the Environmental Protection
Agency (the "EPA") primary responsibility over the environ-
mental regulation of biotechnology. 124 The EPA's regulation
of biotechnology has focused on the introduction of microor-
ganisms into the environment. 125 The EPA derives its specific
authority to regulate the release of GMOs from two statutes:
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA")12 and the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"). 27
FIFRA treats biopesticides, microorganisms intended for
use as pesticides, as chemical pesticides. 28 All pesticides must
be registered with the EPA under FIFRA.' 29  FIFRA's provi-
sions also require the EPA to issue a permit before the field
120. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986); see Moses, supra note 13, at 105 (discussing the
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology).
121. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986).
122. Id.
123. Id. The Coordinated Framework discusses the laws and policies of the
NIH, the FDA, the EPA, the USDA, the OSHA, and the National Science Foundation.
Id.
Commentators have argued that a centralized agency to regulate biotechnology
would be more efficient. See Harrington, supra note 118, at 28 (suggesting that, "a
centralized federal agency be created and charged with the responsibility of regulat-
ing only biotechnology"). Id.; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Note, The Rutabaga that Ate
Pittsburgh: Federal Regulation of Free Release Biotechnology, 72 VA. L. REV. 1529 (1986)
(proposing centralized data bank for federal regulation of deliberate release);
Marchant, supra note 104, at 207-08 (concluding that most promising approach for
improving biotechnology regulation would be changes within current regulatory
framework).
124. Moses, supra note 13, at 107; FIELD TESTING, supra note 20, at 138.
125. See, e.g., Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313
(1986); Moses, supra note 13, at 107.
126. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") 7 U.S.C
§ 136-136(y) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
127. See Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2629 (1988
& Supp. III 1991).
128. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 162.5(c)(4) (1991).
129. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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testing of any bioengineered pesticide. 30 In order to issue the
permit, the EPA must determine that the field test will not
cause an "unreasonable adverse effect" on the environment.'13
FIFRA places the burden of proof that the benefits of the prod-
uct outweigh its risks on the permit applicant.
32
The TSCA authorizes the EPA to acquire information on
chemical substances in order to identify potential hazards and
exposures. 3 3 The manufacturer of a new chemical must sub-
mit data on the chemical's safety to the EPA.' 34 Unless the
chemical presents an unreasonable risk to human health or the
environment, the EPA must allow the marketing of the new
chemical. 35 Under the TSCA, the EPA treats microorganisms
and their DNA molecules as chemical substances subject to the
TSCA's provisions.'3 6 Thus, the TSCA's requirements apply
to bioremediation products, bioengineered growth hormones,
and other biotechnology products.
3 7
The Food and Drug Administration (the "FDA") reviews
genetically engineered food products for food safety.' 31 The
FDA derives its regulatory authority from the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, which requires that the manufacturer or im-
porter of a product establish its safety to the FDA's satisfaction
before marketing.' 39 The FDA regulates human and animal
drugs, medical devices, human and animal foods, food addi-
130. 40 C.F.R. § 158.170 (1991); Elizabeth A. Milewski, The Approach of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency in Regulating Certain Biotechnology Products, in RISK As-
SESSMENT, supra note 3, at 184.
131. 7 U.S.C. § 136c(d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see Milewski, supra note 130, at
184 (discussing FIFRA); Harrington, supra note 118, at 27 (discussing FIFRA).
132. See 7 U.S.C. § 136c(d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
133. See 15 U.S.C. 99 2607(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2602(1), 2604(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313
(1986).
137. See 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313 (1986) (discussing application of TSCA to biotech-
nology products); see also OTA, supra note 1, at 179. As of March 1991, nine appli-
cants for field tests of genetically engineered micro-organisms had been approved by
the EPA under TSCA, mainly for nitrogen-fixing bacteria. Id.
138. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986); see Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From
New Plant Varieties; Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (1992) (announcing FDA policy
toward genetically modified foods); see generally Tomato Gene, supra note 19 (discussing
FDA's decision not to require special approval for genetically engineered foods).
139. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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tives, and cosmetics.' 40
While the FDA regulates the marketing of genetically
modified foods,' 4 ' the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the
"USDA") regulates the release of genetically modified plants,
animals, and microorganisms involved in agricultural biotech-
nology research. 42 The USDA uses the Federal Plant Pest Act
(the ."PPA") and the Plant Quarantine Act to regulate the re-
lease of genetically engineered micro-organisms derived from
plant pests.' 43 The PPA applies to environmental releases of
insects or worms considered to be plant pests or organisms
containing genetic material from plant pests. 4 4 The Animal
Plant Health and Inspection Service ("APHIS") is the agency
within the USDA responsible for the regulation of genetically
engineered plants, microorganisms, and animal biologics.' 45
APHIS requires that researchers submit a detailed description
of their proposed field test in order to receive a permit.' 46 As
of September 1991, APHIS has issued 181 permits for small-
scale field testing of genetically engineered plants or microor-
ganisms. 47
In March 1993, APHIS announced regulations for a notifi-
cation process for the introduction of genetically engineered
organisms and products.' 48 The regulations also included a
petition process allowing for a determination that certain arti-
140. 21 U.S.C.§ 321 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
141. See NEw TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 201 (stating that "FDA's au-
thority is.over the final food product in interstate commerce").
142. See Proposed USDA Guidelines for Research Involving the Planned Intro-
duction Into the Environment of Organisms With Deliberately Modified Hereditary
Traits, 56 Fed. Reg. 4134 (1991) (proposing USDA guidelines for assessing safety of
planned releases of GMOs).
143. Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-150jj (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 7
C.F.R. § 340 (1991); NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 185. The Plant
Quarantine Act can also be used to regulate deliberate releases but has rarely been
applied to GMOs. Id.; Plant Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. § 151-164a, § 166-67 (1988).
144. 7 C.F.R. § 340 (1993); see NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 185
(discussing Plant Pest Act).
145. See Moses, supra note 13, at 107; see NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6,
at 192-93 (explaining that vaccines and medical diagnostic tests are examples of bio-
logics).
146. See Conroy, supra note 104 (applying for permit costs average of US$5,000
and permit approval process may take up to four months).
147. NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 183.
148. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures
for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated
Status; Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 17044 (1993) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 340).
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cles are no longer regulated articles.' 49
3. No Deliberate Release Regulations
In order to encourage the growth of the biotechnology in-
dustry, many countries with active investments in biotechnol-
ogy have declined to regulate the deliberate release of GMOs
into the environment.' 50 Examples of countries in this cate-
gory are South Korea and Taiwan.' 5 ' In South Korea, the Ge-
netic Engineering Promotion law was passed in 1983 to pro-
mote the biotechnology industry by establishing a basic plan to
form genetic research programs and by creating a council for
genetic engineering policy. 52 Like South Korea, the govern-
ment of Taiwan has focused its efforts on the promotion of
biotechnology and has no regulations for deliberate re-
leases. 153
Other countries with no regulations for biotechnology in-
clude Latin American, Caribbean, and Eastern European na-
tions. 154 Many of these countries have sent their representa-
149. Id.
150. OTA, supra note 1, at 188.
151. Id. at 152; Biotech Grows in Hong Kong, 352 NATURE 273, July 25 1991 (stat-
ing that "[sleveral Asian governments regard biotechnology as an obvious successor
to consumer electronics in their struggle to succeed in the world's high-technology
markets").
152. See OTA, supra note 1, at 238 (discussing Korean Genetic Engineering Pro-
motion Law 1983). The Korean Genetic Research Association (KOGERA) includes
the nineteen largest Korean firms engaged in biotechnology which dominate indus-
trial activity in South Korea. Id.
153. Id. at 240. See Biotech Grows in Hong Kong, supra note 151, at 273 (stating
that Taiwanese government has invested several million US dollars into biotechnol-
ogy-related industries). Id.; McGarity, supra note 1, at 424 n.2 (citing Pacific Rim Tac-
tic: U.S. Partners Now, Worldwide Bio-Markets Later, BIOTECH. NEWSWATCH, Sept. 19,
1988, at 7 (discussing Taiwanese government's tax incentives for research and devel-
opment investments)).
154. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTERNATIONAL OFFICE OF
EpizooTics, GUIDELINES FOR THE RELEASE INTO THE ENVIRONMENT OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS, Prologue (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agri-
culture/Canadian International Development Agency Project 1991); Biotech Regula-
tions Bite, supra note 99, at 18 (reporting that within Eastern European bloc, no spe-
cific legislation for biotechnology exists, although the former Yugoslavia has applied
OECD's guidelines).
In general, developing countries have no regulations for biotechnology in their
regulatory agencies. NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 207. This situation,
however, is changing very rapidly. Letter from John H. Barton, George E. Osborne
Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, to author (May 26, 1993) (on file with the
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL) [hereinafter Barton letter]. Mexico, the Phil-
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tives to the United States to learn about biotechnology regula-
tion. 55  Countries that have exchanged regulatory scheme
information with the United States include China, India, Mex-
ico, Costa Rica, Brazil,' 56 Argentina, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya,
Zimbabwe, Thailand, and the Philippines. 57 Some of these
countries with no regulations for deliberate releases have
served as test sites for researchers escaping the regulatory
oversight of their own countries. 58 For example, the Wistar
Institute of Philadelphia conducted tests for a genetically engi-
neered vaccine on cattle in Argentina.' 59
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
International harmonization of regulations for deliberate
releases can reduce trade barriers and improve regulatory
methodologies. 60  Recognizing the benefits of international
harmonization, many nations have participated in multilateral
efforts to regulate the deliberate release of GMOs.' 6 ' Among
these international efforts, the greatest number of nations par-
ticipated in the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Envi-
ippines, Thailand and India either have passed or are currently developing regula-
tions for deliberate releases. Id.
155. NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 207.
156. See OTA, supra note 1, at 231. Interestingly, Brazil has chosen to adopt the
regulatory guidelines of the United States's NIH and EPA for laboratory and envi-
ronmental safety. Id. Brazil presently has an entire branch of government devoted
to biotechnology and is concerned about deliberate releases. Id. at 230.
157. Id.
158. Huber, supra note 104, at 57 (noting example of Wistar Institute's testing
of vaccine in Argentina).
159. Id.; L. Chris Heinemeyer, Note, Oversight of the Release of Genetically Altered
Microorganisms: Suggestions for an International Approach, 24 TEX. INTL. LJ. 331, 350
(1989).
160. See GIBBS, supra note 10, at 264 (stating that international harmonization
would be beneficial). The formal U.S. policy is to promote scientific cooperation,
reduce trade barriers, and gain recognition among nations of the importance of har-
monizing biotechnology regulation. Id. at 264 n. 1 (citing Coordinated Framework
for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,308 (1986)).
161. See e.g., Agenda 21, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.151/26/Rev.1
(1993); Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. at 818 (1992); 1992 REPORT, supra note 12; 1986 REPORT, supra 12; Council
Directive No. 90/220, 1990 O.J. (L 117); see also Environment: Seven States Sign Civil
Liability Convention, EUR. REP. Jun. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI
File (stating that Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and
Netherlands have signed an international convention on civil liability for damage re-
sulting from activities dangerous to environment, including the use of GMOs).
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ronment and Development ("UNCED" or the "Earth Sum-
mit") in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 162 The Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development (the "OECD"), in its
effort to address the particular needs of industrialized nations,
has produced reports recommending specific safety measures
for field testing of GMOs.163 To date, the most comprehensive
multi-national deliberate release regulations are the EC direc-
tives for notification and endorsement of deliberate releases
for both research and commercial purposes." 4
A. The Earth Summit in Rio
The UNCED was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on June 3-
14, 1992.165 The Earth Summit addressed many global issues,
including the environmental management of biotechnology.166
During the Earth Summit, 182 participating nations adopted
Agenda 21, while 153 nations signed the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (the "Biodiversity Treaty").167 Both Agenda
21 and the Biodiversity Treaty address safety regulations con-
cerning GMOs.168
Agenda 21 is an action plan calling for sustainable eco-
nomic growth through international cooperation. 169 Chapter
162. See Earth Summit approves Agenda 21, Rio Declaration Record number of world
leaders attend, U.N. CHRONICLE, Sept. 1992, at 59 [hereinafter Earth Summit approves
Agenda 21] (stating that 182 nations participated in Earth Summit); Bette Hileman,
Earth Summit Concludes With Agenda for Action, but Little Funding, CHEMICAL & ENGINEER-
ING NEws,July 6, 1992, at 7 (stating that 153 nations had signed Biodiversity Treaty).
163. 1992 REPORT, supra note 12; 1986 REPORT, supra note 12.
164. See e.g., Council Directive No. 90/220, 1990 OJ. (L 117); Council Decision
No. 92/146, 1992 O.J. (L 60).
165. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, supra note
12, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 151/26/Rev.1 (1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992); Earth
Summit, U.N. CHRONICLE, June 1992, at 40.
166. Earth Summit, supra note 165, at 53.
167. See Earth Summit approves Agenda 21, supra note 162, at 59 (stating that 182
nations unanimously adopted Agenda 21 and Biodiversity Treaty was opened for sig-
nature); Hileman, supra note 162, at 7 (stating that 153 nations signed Biodiversity
Treaty).
The Biodiversity Treaty will enter into force after ratification by 30 states. As of
August 1993, there are only 19 ratifications, so the Biodiversity Treaty is not yet
enforceable. Telephone interview with the United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs,
Treaty Division, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 10, 1993).
168. Agenda 21, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Revl Vol. I ch. 16,
at 218 (1993); Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 (1992), 31
I.L.M. at 818.
169. See Earth Summit, supra note 165, at 44. Agenda 21 links economic develop-
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16 of Agenda 21, entitled "Environmentally Sound Manage-
ment of Biotechnology," states that Agenda 2 l's goal is to fos-
ter international principles for the environmental management
of biotechnology, as well as to promote sustainable applica-
tions of biotechnology. 70  Other portions of Agenda 21 that
address biotechnology include Chapter 14, which provides for
the sharing of research and plant genetic resources among na-
tions, 17' and Chapter 19, which deals with risk management of
toxic chemicals and may also apply to certain biopesticides and
other hazardous products of biotechnology.17 2 Chapter 15 of
Agenda 21 is intended to improve the conservation of biologi-
cal diversity and supports the Biodiversity Treaty.17 3
The Biodiversity Treaty calls for the transfer of technol-
ogy from economically more advanced countries to less devel-
oped countries in an attempt to create a more equitable world
order.' 74 To make reparations for genetic material taken out
of a developing country, the Biodiversity Treaty requires that
ment with environmental protection, in furtherance of achieving sustained develop-
ment. Id. Agenda 21 aims to "lead to the fulfillment of basic needs, improved living
standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more pros-
perous future," extending into the twenty-first century." Id.
170. See Agenda 21, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.151/26/Rev.I (Vol. I) ch.
16, at 218 (1993). Chapter 16 determined the final program areas in biotechnology:
a) increasing the availability of food, feed and renewable raw materials; b) improving
human health; c) enhancing protection of the environment; d) enhancing safety and
developing international mechanisms for cooperation; and e) establishing enabling
mechanisms for the development and the environmentally sound application of bio-
technology. Id.
171. Agenda 21, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.151/26/Rev.I (Vol. I)
14.57(d) at 195 (1993). "To take appropriate measures for the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits and results of research and development in plant breeding be-
tween sources and users of plant genetic resources." Id.
172. Agenda 21, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.151/26/Rev.l (Vol. I) ch. 19,
at 315 (1993).
173. Agenda 21, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.151/26/Rev.I (Vol. I) ch. 15,
at 210 (1993).
174. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 art. 16 at 9 (1992);
31 I.L.M. at 829; see The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora's Box or Fair Deal?, 245 Sci. 1624,
June 19, 1992 (discussing technology transfer proposed in Biodiversity Treaty); see
generally Timothy M. Swanson, Economics of a Biodiversity Convention, 21 AMBIO No.3,
at 250 (May 1992) (discussing technology transfer proposed in Biodiversity Treaty).
The rosy periwinkle flower of Madagascar was used to manufacture a remedy for
Hodgkin's Disease. Id. at 255. Although sales of the remedy yielded millions of dol-
lars in profits for pharmaceutical companies, Madagascar has not received any reve-
nues from the sale of this important new drug. Id. The purpose of the Biodiversity
Treaty was to rectify these types of situations. Id. at 255-56.
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signatories either share technologies or remunerate the devel-
oping country.' 75 Article 19 of the Biodiversity Treaty pro-
vides for safety regulations to guard against the potential ad-
verse affects of specific genetically modified organisms.' 76 The
Biodiversity Treaty, however, does not mention GMOs,
although GMOs are understood to be a part of the Treaty. 77
Because the Biodiversity Treaty does not enunciate specific
regulations, the Treaty provides for the adoption of a later
protocol that will specify detailed biotechnology safety meas-
ures, including the safe transfer of GMOs.'
78
B. Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development
The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (the "OECD") is an international organization, of
twenty-four industrialized countries whose purpose is to en-
courage economic growth and development for its mem-
bers. 79 In 1986, the OECD published an extensive report
175. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 arts. 16, 20, 21 at
9, 11, 12 (1992); 31 I.L.M. at 829, 830-32 (1993). The U.S. did not sign the Bi-
odiversity Treaty because of the treaty's points on technology transfer, intellectual
property rights, biotechnology and biosafety, and the financial mechanisms. 31 I.L.M
at 817 (1992). But see Timothy Noah, Clinton to Back International Accord On Environment
That Bush Spurned, WALL ST. J. Apr. 22, 1992, at B7 (announcing that U.S. President
Clinton will sign Biodiversity Treaty).
176. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 art. 19 at 10-11
(1992); 31 I.L.M. at 830.
177. See UNEP News Release, May 26, 1992 (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (stating that at urging of the United States, treaty did not refer specifi-
cally to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). But GMOs are understood to be
included in broader terms, such as "living modified organisms resulting from bio-
technology").
178. See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 art. 19(3) at 11
(1992), 31 I.L.M. at 830.
179. See ALAN T. BULL, BIOTECHNOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND PERSPEC-
TIVES 2 (OECD 1982). The OECD is an intergovernmental organization comprised
of 24 industrialized countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, the former Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, It-
aly, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The
OECD was set up under a convention in Paris on December 14, 1960. Id. The con-
vention provides that the OECD shall promote policies designed to achieve the high-
est sustainable economic growth and employment . . . to contribute to sound eco-
nomic expansion.., to contribute to world trade on a multi-lateral, non-discrimina-
tory basis in accordance with international obligation. Id.; OTA, supra note 1, at 135
(discussing OECD countries pursuing biotechnology research and development in
improved waste treatment). Although several OECD countries have pursued bi-
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identifying safety considerations associated with rDNA prod-
ucts.'8 ° In general, the Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations-
Safety Considerations for Industrial, Agricultural and Environmental
Applications of Organisms Derived by Recombinant DNA Techniques
(the "1986 Report") stated that there was no scientific basis for
enacting process-oriented legislation to regulate the use of
rDNA techniques.' 8 ' The 1986 Report recommended that the
regulations of member countries should not impede future de-
velopments in rDNA techniques. 8 2 The 1986 Report also
stated that the development of international guidelines was
premature, but that harmonization could be facilitated by ex-
changing information. 8 3 According to the 1986 Report, envi-
ronmental and agricultural applications for deliberate releases
should be reviewed by a "national or other authority" on a
case-by-case basis."8 4 The 1986 Report concluded that the
available data on the introduction of GMOs should be used to
evaluate risks and that the controlled field testing of GMOs
should be encouraged as it may provide the only mechanism
for obtaining valid data.I8 5
The 1986 Report was followed in 1992 by Safety Considera-
tions for Biotechnology (the "1992 Report"), which contained
safety assessments for small-scale field tests of GMOs.186 The
1992 Report developed general principles for the design and
the safety assessment of small-scale field testing of GMOs that
have low or negligible risk. 187 The principles, labeled Good
Development Principles ("GDP"), are based on the assump-
otechnological research and development in improved waste treatment, research ef-
forts in safety issues have been minimal. Id.
180. 1986 REPORT, supra note 12, at 24-31.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 41-42.
184. Id. at 42. The phrase "case-by-case" was defined as, "an individual review
of a proposal against assessment criteria which are relevant to the particular propo-
sal; this is not intended to imply that every case will require review by a national or
other authority since various classes of proposals may be excluded." Id. For large-
scale industrial applications involving GMOs, the OECD recommended that low-risk
microorganisms could be handled under conditions of Good Industrial Large-Scale
Practice ("GILSP") which sets standards for the contained industrial use of GMOs.
Id.
185. Id. at 39; see GIBBs, supra note 10, at 265-66 (discussing conclusions of
1986 Report).
186. 1992 REPORT, supra note 12, at 25.
187. Id. at 25.
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tion that low or negligible risk for small-scale field testing of
GMOs can be identified.' 8 The GDP were developed under
three assumptions. First, certain general scientific principles
are more important in determining the risk of a field test than
others.'8 9 Second, the potential risk can be determined by
evaluating the conditions of the experiment.' 9 0 Third, assess-
ing the interaction of these risk factors is easier in small-scale
field experiments.' 9 ' The 1992 Report identified the origin
and characteristics of the GMO, the research site, and the ex-
perimental conditions as the three key safety factors in deter-
mining the safety of a field test. 92 The report developed two
sets of GDP, one for plants and one for microorganisms. 93
The general guidelines set by the GDP are a significant depar-
ture from the case-by-case approach recommended by the
1986 Report. 94 The efforts of the OECD have been both
lauded and criticized. 195 Nevertheless, the 1986 Report has
had considerable influence on the development of regulations
and guidelines worldwide.' 96 The GDP were adopted by the
188. Id. at 28.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 28-29.
191. Id. at 29.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 31-32 (stating that GDP for plants requires that genetically modi-
fied plants remain reproductively isolated from sexually compatible plants outside
experimental site and not released beyond research site; or plants are used, which
even without reproductive isolation, will not cause uncontrolled adverse effects).
The GDP for microorganisms recommends that genetic transfer and dissemination
be controlled or field experiment designed so that no unintended adverse affects on
other organisms will occur, even though transfer and dissemination occur. Id. at 32.
194. Compare 1992 REPORT, supra note 12 (discussing GDP for Plants and micro-
organisms in 1990 OECD Report) with 1986 REPORT, supra note 12 (describing case-
by-case risk analysis of deliberate releases recommended by 1986 OECD Report).
195. Compare NEw TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 205 (describing OECD
report as "the most compelling example of harmonization in the development of a
common document on biotechnology safety") and Moses, supra note 13, at 110,
(describing OECD's 1990 report as step "towards harmonization of the scientific
principles underpinning the regulatory approaches of its member countries") with
GIBBS, supra note 10, at 272 (criticizing report as only identifying considerations, and
"broad recommendations," rather than specific regulatory framework) and
Heinemeyer, Note, supra note 159, at 358-59 (criticizing OECD recommendations).
See also McGarity, supra note 1, at 446 n.96 (discussing case-by-case approach of
OECD recommendations).
196. Moses, supra note 13, at 110. The OECD's principles of Good Industrial
Large-Scale Practice, 1986 REPORT, supra note 12, has been widely applied. Moses,
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twenty-four member countries of the OECD. 9 7 As the United
States was the lead country in developing the document, the
OECD recommendations are in harmony with the regulations
of the United States and promote international trade among
the OECD members.' 98
C. European Community Directives
The European Community (the "EC") is an economic
union of twelve European nations. t99 The Single European
Act of 1987 ("SEA") gives the EC a legal basis to enact envi-
ronmental legislation. 20 0 Article 130(t) of the SEA provides
that decisions of the EC shall not prevent Member States of the
EC from maintaining or introducing their own protective
measures compatible with the EEC Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community. 20'
In 1990, the Council of Ministers of the EC issued Direc-
tive No. 90/220 ("Directive 90/220"), the first multilateral at-
tempt in force to provide a specific legal framework for the de-
liberate release of GMOs.2 °2 Directive 90/220 defines key
supra note 13, at 110; see JAPANESE BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 15, at 60 (citing Ja-
pan's efforts to comply with OECD recommendations).
197. NEw TECHNOLOGICAL ERA, supra note 6, at 205.
198. Id. (stating that OECD recommendations "ensures good harmonization
with U.S. regulations; this in turn, should facilitate international trade.").
199. See Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169) (amending Treaty Establishing
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)) [hereinafter
SEA]. The Member States are France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Germany, Hol-
land, Belgium, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg. Id.; see also
Gerhard Hitzler, Creating the Single Market: The Legislative Agenda, 19 PLANNING REV. 35
(July-Aug. 1991) (stating that SEA stresses creation of integrated economic union as
central objective of EC).
200. SEA, supra note 199, arts. 130(r)-(t), 1987 OJ. (L 169) at 11-12; see David
Freestone, European Community Environmental Policy and Law, LAw POLICY AND THE EN-
VIRONMENT 135, 137-38 (1991). Actions taken under Article 130 of the SEA are sub-
ject to the principle of subsidiarity: The Community shall take action relating to the
environment to the extent to which that the objectives [of EC policy] can be attained
better at the Community level than at the level of the individual Member States.
SEA, supra note 199, at art. 130r(4). See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET. AL., EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 1121 (1993) [hereinafter EC LAw]. Subsidiarity requires that the
Community should leave issues to the Member states when they are better equipped
to handle such matters at the national level than the Community is at the Community
level. Id. Article 100(a) of the SEA also provides for environmental protection. Id.
201. SEA, supra note 199, art. 130(t), 1987 OJ. (L 169) at 12.
202. Council Directive No. 90/220, 1990 O.J. (L 117). A directive on the con-
tained use of genetically modified organisms, relating to the use of microbes in
closed systems was adopted at the same time. Council Directive No. 90/219, 1990
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terms regarding the deliberate release of GMOs, solving the
problem of disparate definitions among Member States. 0 Di-
rective 90/220 authorizes the deliberate release of GMOs and
the marketing of commercial GMO products intended for sub-
sequent release into the environment. 20 4 Although Directive
90/220 sets minimum standards for regulations, each individ-
ual Member State must enact its own law that implements the
Directive.205 Member States must also designate competent
authorities because the Directive provides for explicit consent
from a national authority before releases can proceed.20 6 Di-
rective 90/220 stipulates that biotechnological researchers
must also comply with any national laws to which they are also
subject.20 7 Thus, the party proposing deliberate releases in
Member States with strict regulations will have to comply with
national regulations as well as the regulations set forth in Di-
rective 90/220.08
Directive 90/220 distinguishes between deliberate re-
leases for research and development, 20 9 and deliberate re-
leases for commercial products containing GMOs. 210 Before
carrying out a release for research purposes, the party propos-
ing the release must notify the competent national authority in
that party's Member State.2 1 ' The notification of the party's
competent national authority must be accompanied by a de-
O.J. (L. 117). See Proposals for Council Directives on the Deliberate Release to the
Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, COM(88) 160 final at 2 (discussing
reasons for EC's adoption of directive for deliberate releases).
203. See BULL, supra note 179, at 11 (identifying problem with definition of key
terms in all countries); GIBBS, supra note 10, at 274 (discussing difficulty in standard-
izing terms).
204. Council Directive No. 90/220, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 16.
205. Id. art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 117), at 2-3.
206. Id. arts. 5(1) and 4(2)-(3), 1990 OJ. (L 117); see EC LAw, supra note 200, at
1105 (discussing legislative framework for EC environmental action). Article 198 of
the EEC Treaty binds Member States to directives, but Member States have discre-
tion over implementation and enforcement. Id. The use of directives in the environ-
mental area leaves some discretion to the Member States on how to implement Com-
munity rules and considerable discretion respecting their enforcement. Id.
207. Council Directive No. 90/220, art. 4, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 17.
208. Id.
209. Id. arts. 5-9, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 17-18; see generally Coopers & Lybrand,
Pharmaceuticals, EC COMMENTARIES Feb. 11, 1993 § 17.7, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLNWS File (discussing Directive 90/220).
210. Council Directive No. 90/220, arts. 10-18, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 18-20.
211. Id. at art. 5.
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tailed risk assessment offering proof of safety of the proposed
release.21 2 The risk assessment notification must identify the
conditions and the environment in which the release is to oc-
cur, and must include an assessment of the possible hazards
for human health and the environment. 213 Because the risks of
deliberate releases are difficult to predict, Directive 90/220 au-
thorizes releases on a case-by-case basis.21 4
The procedure for the deliberate release of a commercial
GMO product is similar to that previously discussed for re-
search releases.21 5 Before releasing a commercial GMO prod-
uct, the responsible party must notify the competent authority,
providing details on the organisms proposed for the release,
the conditions and the environment in which such release is to
take place, and an assessment of the possible hazards for
human health and the environment. 21 6 To protect trade
secrets, sensitive information supplied to the authorities is kept
confidential. 7 In contrast to a research release, the endorse-
ment procedure for a commercial release requires consultation
with the Commission of the EC (the "Commission") and other
Member States.21 8 Under Article 11(1) of Directive 90/220,
the manufacturer or importer is required to notify the author-
ity in the Member State where the product will be placed on
the market initially. 21 9 Releases require written consent by the
Commission and the other Member States.22 0 The competent
authorities must either reject the application or forward it to
the Commission with a favorable opinion. When sending an
application of approval for a commercial GMO product to the
Commission, the competent authorities appointed by Member
States must include notification dossiers with information on
the product, the genetic modification, and its possible impact
212. Id.
213. Id.; see Moses, supra note 13, at 113 (discussing Directive 90/220).
214. Biotechnology: Green Light for EC Directives on Genetically Modified Organisms,
EUR. REP., Mar. 24, 1990, at 12, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
215. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (discussing Directive 90/
220's requirements for experimental releases).
216. Council Directive No. 90/220, arts. 5, 14, 1990 O.J. (L 117) at 17, 20.
217. Id. art. 19(1).
218. Id. arts. 10, 11.
219. Id. art. 11(1).
220. Id. art. 11(5).
221. Id. art. 12(2)-(3)
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on the environment, the geographic areas affected by the re-
lease, and the type of environment for which the product is
suited.2  Notification dossiers submitted to the Commission
for GMO products must also include a summary under Com-
mission Decision No. 92/146, an amendment to Directive 90/
220.22- This amendment requires that the information pro-
vided in the summary be submitted in the format of a standard-
ized, eleven-page questionnaire. 24
Upon receiving an application for a commercial GMO
product, the Commission then circulates the application to the
other Member States. 2 5 If no Member State objects within
sixty days, a written consent is issued and the product can be
placed on the market. 26 In the case of an objection by a Mem-
ber State that cannot be resolved, the Commission may author-
ize the release of the GMO product.22 7 This decision is made
by a majority vote of a committee composed of the representa-
tives of the Member States and chaired by the Commission
representative.2 a
Under Directive 90/220, the Commission must set up an
information exchange system between the Member States.229
Regular meetings between the Member States and the Com-
mission are also required in order to exchange information.23 °
Directive 90/220 also provides for public participation
through consultation on planned releases. 23' Finally, the Offi-
cial Journal will publish a list of all GMO products receiving
final endorsement. 3 2
Through Directive 90/220, the EC has chosen a process-
oriented approach that is specific to biotechnology, instead of
222. Id. arts. 10-18.
223. Commission Decision No. 92/146, 1992 OJ. (L 60).
224. Id.
225. Council Directive No. 90/220, art. 13(1), 1990 O.J. (L 117) at 19.
226. Id. art. 13(2).
227. Id. art. 13(3). A release over a Member State objection requires a majority
vote of a committee of representatives of Member States. Id. art. 21.
228. Id. arts. 21, 9-10. This endorsement procedure does not apply to orga-
nisms already covered by other Commission legislation if it has a similar risk assess-
ment component. Id.
229. Id. art. 9.
230. Id. art. 22.
231. Id. art. 7.
232. Id. art. 22.
1193
1194 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL I WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1160
adapting pre-existing regulations.23 3 Previous EC environ-
mental regulations were not designed to control the risks that
could arise from the deliberate or accidental release of new liv-
ing organisms into the environment. 23 4  Directive 90/220 fo-
cuses on notification and product characterization and has no
clear standard or guidelines for making risk assessments. 3 5
D. United Nations Guidelines
Although developing countries have no government re-
strictions for the deliberate release of GMOs, the United Na-
tions Industrial Development Organization has produced a
voluntary code for developing countries to provide guidance
for the deliberate release of GMOs.23 6 In Latin America, the
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture,23 7
the Pan American Health Organization, 3 8 the Organization of
American States, 239 and the International Office of Epizoot-
233. See Newmark, supra note 51, at 653 (explaining that EC examines GMO
products as special category, unlike approach of U.S.).
234. Id.
235. Council Directive No. 90/220, 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 15-27; Details of New EC
GMO Regulations, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, Mar 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, ALLNWS File (acknowledging risk assessment for deliberate releases cannot
be carried out by Council on basis of eleven-page standardized notification sum-
mary).
236. International Biosafety Guidelines and Code of Conduct for the Release of Genetically
Engineered Microorganisms and Plants, United Nations Industrial Development Organi-
zation [hereinafter UNIDO], reprinted in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIO-TECHNOLOGY
MONITOR, Sept. 1992, at 1-28. An international group of scientific experts represent-
ing developing and developed nations were organized by UNIDO to prepare a volun-
tary code of conduct for releasing GMOs into the environment. Id. at 1. The group
of experts also recommended the establishment of a biosafety information network
and advisory service (BINAS) to advise developing countries without guidelines on
biosafety matters. Id. The code stipulates general principles and attempts to harmo-
nize existing guidelines for deliberate releases. Id. The code has been endorsed by
UNIDO, the United Nations Environment Programme (hereinafter UNEP), the
World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations. Id.
237. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 193 (Linda Irvin ed., 1991). Inter-Ameri-
can Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture is an organization to promote economic
and social development through teaching, research, technical assistance, and com-
munication in the field of agriculture and rural life. Id. Members are countries of
North, Central, South America and the Antilles. Id.
238. Id. at 737. The Pan American Health Organization is an organization com-
posed of governments of Western Hemisphere nations united to improve physical
and mental health in the Americas. Id.
239. Id. at 876. The Organization of American States is an organization for
peace and justice among American nations, to promote their stability, to strengthen
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ics, 24° have jointly developed guidelines for genetic engineer-
ing research. 41
III. HARMONIZATION OF DELIBERATE RELEASE
REGULATIONS
The ecological and geographic ranges of GMOs transcend
political boundaries.242 The potential risks of deliberate re-
leases, as well as the variation in current deliberate release
regulations in individual countries, illustrate the need for an
international approach to regulating deliberate releases.243
Although international coordination of risk assessment and
regulation of biotechnology is essential 244 current interna-
tional attempts to harmonize deliberate release regulations,
however, are inadequate. These attempts either propose non-
binding principles and vague recommendations, or apply only
to regional areas rather than to an international forum.245 An
international system of regulations should set forth binding
principles. The creation of an international body to regulate
deliberate releases of GMOs is needed to limit potential envi-
ronmental risks while fostering trade.24
6
their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inde-
pendence. Id.
240. Id. at 809. The International Office of Epizootics offers veterinary services
to national ministries of agriculture. Id.
241. GUIDELINES FOR THE RELEASE INTO THE ENVIRONMENT OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS, supra note 159, at 9.
242. Tiedje, supra note 35, at 311.
243. See Biotechnology; Directives Could Cripple Biotech Sector, Critics Warn 2 1992 -
THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION, No. 1, Apr. 6, 1990 at 1, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (stating that industry are sources relieved that
EC biotechnology directives would put an end to the growing confusion of national
standards for marketing biotechnology products); see also Dutch Official Urges Global
Approach to Biotechnology Risk, Assessment Issues, supra note 84 (stating that "a global
approach to mange biotechnology safety would ensure that biotechnology's benefits
are spread around, while risks are minimized").
244. Tiedje, supra note 35, at 311.
245. See GIBBS, supra note 10, at 272 (stating that broad nature of 1986 OECD
report can result in two governments citing 1986 OECD report and still develop very
different regulations); supra note 199 (listing EC Member States); Edith Brown Weiss,
International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues & the Emergence of a New World Order,
81 GEO. L.J. 675, 685 (1993) (describing Agenda 21 as non-binding instrument).
246. See Tiedje, supra note 35, at 311 (urging local, state, national, and interna-
tional cooperation in regulation, risk assessment, and risk management of ecological
effects of introduction of GMOs into environment); supra note 46 (discussing trans-
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A. Problems with Disparate Regulations in Different Countries
Although the benefits of biotechnology should be avail-
able to as many people as possible, the disparate release regu-
lations currently in effect in individual countries presents
problems for both industrialized and smaller nations. 247  At
present, a biotechnology company marketing a new GMO
product internationally must comply with the deliberate re-
lease laws of each individual country.248 Compliance with the
regulations of each country can add incrementally to the cost
of marketing a new product worldwide. 24 9 The cost associated
with regulatory compliance may discourage the development
of some GMO products.25 °
In addition, industrialized countries with very stringent
regulations can restrict imports of bioengineered products
from countries without the resources to comply with the strin-
gent regulations. 25' Exporting countries, especially smaller
ones without large home markets, will need to satisfy the regu-
lations of potential importers of their products.252 Thus na-
tions may use their stringent deliberate release regulations to
discourage the marketing of products from other countries and
keep out unwanted foreign competition.2 53
boundary dangers of GMOs); see also note 15, supra and accompanying text (discuss-
ing benefits of harmonization of deliberate release regulations).
247. Dutch Official Urges Global Approach to Biotechnology Risk, Assessment Issues, supra
note 84 (quoting Dutch policymaker stating that director of UNCED secretariat, has
proposed Biotechnology Consortium for Development, as joint venture among
shareholders from developing countries, international agencies, and private sector);
see supra notes 56-149 and accompanying text (discussing deliberate release regula-
tions in individual nations).
248. See supra notes 56-149 and accompanying text (discussing deliberate re-
lease regulations in individual nations).
249. Id.
250. See Aldhous, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing costs associated with regulatory
compliance).
251. See McGarity, supra note 1, at 438 (stating that health and environmental
considerations may be used as ruse to erect protectionist walls against competing
technology from another country).
252. OTA, supra note 1, at 186. Telephone Interview with Dr. Robert Yuan,
Prof. of Microbiology at the University of Maryland, and co-author Of JAPANESE BIo-
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 15 (Feb. 8, 1993) [hereinafter "Yuan interview"]. Forcing
smaller nations to adapt to the regulatory standards of leaders in the field may even
be viewed as colonialism. Id.
253. See Speech of Mr. Ripa Di Meana, Speech at the SCI Conference (Society of
International Chemical Industries) Monte Carlo, Oct. 8, 1990, RAPID, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
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A multinational company that faces stringent regulatory
requirements in one country is likely to choose to conduct field
testing and marketing in a country with less-stringent regula-
tions.254 Because underdeveloped nations often have less
stringent regulations, they may be easily exploited by both re-
searchers and multinational companies escaping the strict reg-
ulatory climate of their own countries.255
B. Critique of Current International Treaties
No adequate international framework for the regulation of
deliberate releases currently exists, although attempts have
been made.256 The Earth Summit, the most recent attempt to
regulate the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment,
resulted in a large number of nations adopting Agenda 21.257
The Earth Summit, however, failed to provide specific details
for the implementation of the ambitious aims of the confer-
ence.25" Although Agenda 21 identifies the need to develop a
framework of internationally accepted guidelines for biotech-
nology safety,25 9 it is a non-binding statement of broad princi-
ples and goals.2 6 ° Agenda 21 offers no protection to countries
because it lacks specific regulations and enforcement mecha-
[It is very difficult to trace the line between measures adopted by a Member
State in pursuance of its undoubted right to protect its own environment,
and measures taken by a Member State in order to protect its market, for its
home-produced products and against the imported, foreign products.
Member States must resist the temptation to introduce measures to re-
strict trade in the disguise [sic] of environmental protection measures.
Id.
254. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; Hudson, supra note 83, at BI
(stating that BASF Germany plans to move to Boston); see also McGarity, supra note 1,
at 435 (discussing forum shopping).
255. McGarity supra note 1, at 435.
256. See supra notes 159-241 (discussing international agreements for deliberate
releases of GMOs).
257. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (stating that 182 nations adopted
Agenda 21 during Earth Summit).
258. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (describing need for protocol to
specify needed concrete safety measures for biotechnology).
259. See supra note 170 (stating Agenda 21's goal of international biosafety regu-
lations).
260. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT:
STRENGTHENING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Aug. 1992 at
3 (describing Agenda 21 as non-binding action program which identifies specific
measures for environmentally sustainable development).
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nisms.2 6 ' The Biodiversity Treaty is also a vague set of recom-
mendations offering no specific guidance for regulating delib-
erate releases of GMOs.262 Even the drafters of the Biodivers-
ity Treaty recognized that there would be a need for specific
regulations and inserted a provision into the Biodiversity
Treaty for a biotechnology protocol to be enacted at a later
date.263
Similarly, the OECD's 1986 Report offers only broad rec-
ommendations for deliberate releases. 264 Although the
OECD's 1992 Report does offer specific guidelines for assess-
ing the safety of small-scale field tests of GMOs, the GDP are
only a starting point for risk assessment.2 65 The effectiveness
of the GDP published in the 1992 Report have yet to be
tested. 66
Although the OECD is a well-respected international
body, with the United States, Japan and many European coun-
tries as members, the OECD's membership is limited to 24 in-
dustrialized nations.267 Thus its guidelines do not address in-
ternational concerns because they are limited to industrialized
nations with specialized interests. 26 Developing nations prob-
ably will not implement these recommendations because they
lack the advanced industrial needs addressed by the guide-
lines.269
The EC's Directive 90/220 for deliberate releases, along
with its subsequent amendment, is also limited because of its
regional application. International regulations that apply to
261. Id.
262. See supra notes 177-78 (discussing ambiguities in Biodiversity Treaty).
263. See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 12, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 art. 19(3), at 11
(1992), 31 I.L.M. at 830.
264. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text (discussing OECD's 1986
REPORT).
265. See supra note 186-98 (discussing GDP of 1992 REPORT).
266. Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority:
Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed.
Reg. 6753 (1992) (announcing U.S. policy for assessing risk of deliberate releases).
Categories of, inclusion and exclusion are currently being developed by the United
States in accordance with principles of risk assessment similar to the OECD's GDP.
Id.
267. See BULL, supra note 179 (listing 24 member nations of OECD).
268. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing goals of the OECD).
269. Heinemeyer, supra note 159, at 359. Contra Biotech Regulations Bite, supra
note 99, at 18 (stating that Yugoslavia has applied OECD guidelines).
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more than just EC Member States are necessary. An interna-
tional regulatory scheme should include all countries active in
biotechnology. Directive 90/220 also lacks harmonization with
the United States and Japan, the world leaders in biotechnol-
ogy.2 70 Because other nations apply U.S. regulatory decisions
in their own countries, the participation of the United States
would be necessary in any international regulatory frame-
work.27' In addition, representatives of the European biotech-
nology industry have complained about the stringency of Di-
rective 90/220.72
Even with its short comings, Directive 90/220, as
amended, is the best attempt at international harmonization of
deliberate release regulations thus far. The Directive provides
a unified legal framework for all phases of deliberate releases,
from small-scale field experiments to commercial releases of
GMO products and, therefore, provides community safe-
guards. 273 The EC has successfully promulgated a Directive
that encompass a wide range of regulatory schemes, ranging
from Denmark's stringent regulations to countries with no reg-
ulations for deliberate releases.2 74 Although Directive 90/220
does not subvert Member State regulation, it does set a mini-
mum standard for regulating deliberate releases.2 75 Directive
90/220, as amended, will promote international trade and a
270. See Genetic Engineering, supra note 51 (stating that EC and US use different
regulatory approaches); supra note 88 and accompanying text (stating that Japan
ranks second in world in biotechnology after United States).
271. See supra note 157 (listing nations using U.S. as regulatory model).
272. See supra note 83 (discussing move by German chemical company to U.S.);
Biotechnology: Europe Suspected of Trailing Behind the United States, EUR. REP., Mar. 14,
1992, at 7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (representative of EC bio-
technology industry group suggesting that EC directive on field testing of GMOs will
slow Europe's progress in biotechnology); EFB's Research Budget Worries, supra note 17
(discussing industry complaints in EC nations that regulations are more favorable in
U.S. and Japan). But see Even U.S. Regulations Stifle Research, BiOTECH. Bus. NEWS, Oct.
30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (stating complaints of U.S.
biotechnology industry that U.S. regulations stifle research).
273. See supra notes 202-35 (discussing Directive 90/220).
274. See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text (discussing Danish laws); EC
"Stocktaking" on Biotechnology, supra note 8, (Spain is currently in process of adopting
biotechnology regulations to conform to EC Directives on biotechnology).
275. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing minimum standard
set by Directive 90/220 for EC member states); see also Baiter, supra note 56 (stating
that new EC regulations represent defeat for more extreme segments of Green
Movement).
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common market within the EC by eliminating trade barriers
and harmonizing GMO product regulations. 6
C. Proposal for Harmonization of Deliberate Release Regulations:
An International Regulatory Framework
L Benefits of Harmonization
Harmonization of international regulations for deliberate
releases would solve many of the problems arising from dispa-
rate regulations in individual nations. 77 Harmonization facili-
tates the development of safe biotechnology along common in-
ternational lines and provides the basis of a consensus on pro-
tection of health and environment.2 78 Because GMOs, such as
genetically engineered bacteria, can spread across transna-
tional boundaries and affect the environments of other coun-
tries, countries without domestic legislation for deliberate re-
leases should be subject to international laws regulating delib-
erate releases. 79
Harmonization also leads to the promotion of technologi-
cal and economic development and the reduction of national
barriers to trade in this field.2 8 Industry would be better
served if manufacturers of GMO products had to comply with
only a single set of regulations.2 1 ' A uniform international
standard would reduce trade barriers to make GMO products
more readily available to consumers in all nations. Uniformity
between nations in biotechnology regulation would also facili-
tate greatly the development of international markets. 2
Smaller nations without the resources to sustain an expen-
sive regulatory body would also benefit from international reg-
276. See MANTEGAZZINI, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing 1986 commentary on pos-
sible EC regulations).
277. See id. (stating that harmonization of regulations within the EC will prevent
countries from "under-cutting" one another with less stringent regulations in order
to attract industry); supra note 13 (discussing benefit of harmonization); supra notes
256-76 and accompanying text (criticizing current international attempts to regulate
deliberate releases).
278. See Moses, supra note 13, at 110 (describing benefits of harmonization).
279. See supra notes 46-49 (discussing transboundary nature of genetically modi-
fied microorganisms).
280. MANTEGAZZINI, supra note 6, at 8-9.
281. See Regulation cost concerns, supra note 13 (discussing complaints of European
biotechnology industry).
282. McGarity, supra note 1, at 437.
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ulations.2 s3 Rather than rely upon the regulatory decisions of
another country, developing countries could rely on the risk
assessment of an international body.28 4 International regula-
tions would protect nations that do not have the expertise to
evaluate the risks connected with new biotechnologies. s5
Thus, an international regulatory body would avoid the prob-
lem of contemporary colonialization.2 sn
2. Proposal for an International Regulatory Framework
Because the benefits of biotechnology would not be avail-
able to the public without industrial efforts to market biotech-
nology products, the needs of industry must be considered in a
proposal for an international regulatory framework. 8 7 Indus-
trial regulatory needs include quick regulatory approvals, low
compliance costs, and simplicity of regulations.28 8 Strict inter-
national regulations would only hamper industrial efforts. 2 9 A
very practical proposal for international standards calls for a
regulatory scheme that would reduce risks to an acceptable
level while allowing biotechnology companies to maintain their
competitiveness.2 90  Therefore, an international regulatory
283. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (stating that developing
countries generally do not have biotechnology regulations).
284. See, e.g., supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing UNIDO's Inter-
national Biosafety Guidelines and Code of Conduct for the Release of Genetically Engineered Mi-
croorganisms and Plants for developing nations).
285. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (discussing developing na-
tions with no regulations); EC "Stocktaking" on Biotechnology, supra note 9. Italy and
Spain had no previous regulations for deliberate releases and are now adopting the
EC directive. Id.; see also Environmental Assessment and Development Aid, THE OECD OB-
SERVER, at 23-24 (June-July 1987).
286. Yuan interview, supra note 252. Contemporary colonialization occurs when
lesser developed countries are forced to adapt to the regulatory standards of devel-
oped nations. Id.
287. See Biotechnology: Industrialists Unhappy About GMO Directives, EUR. REP. Oct.
7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (representative of 31 EC-based
biotechnology companies stating that EC GMO directives results in longer time
needed to develop and market new products and technologies); see generally OTA,
supra note 1, at 3 (discussing biotechnology product development).
288. See Conroy, supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of
U.S. regulatory scheme).
289. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (regulations can result in prod-
ucts taking longer to get to market); see, e.g., supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text
(discussing complaints of German industry regarding stringent regulations).
290. See McGarity, supra note 1, at 439 (proposing controls to reduce risks posed
by international proliferation of biotechnology to acceptable level and to provide "a
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scheme should be designed to encourage industrial activity
and research into the field, and to promote the flow of trade,
while guarding against potential harms.
Uniformity through international law can be achieved by
an international agreement for the deliberate release of viable
genetically modified organisms into the air, water, or land.2 9
The international agreement should provide minimum health
and environmental protection in all countries in which compa-
nies are likely to conduct field tests, erect manufacturing facili-
ties, or otherwise expose humans and the environment to ge-
netically modified plants and microorganisms.292 Such an
agreement should also be flexible in its requirements.293
Therefore, it should contain mechanisms by which provisions
can be modified to reflect the latest scientific understanding. 294
Each nation participating in the international agreement
should appoint a representative to an international regulatory
body which would administer the proposed international regu-
lations.295 Because GMOs can cross national borders, the par-
ticipation of all nations that could be affected by the deliberate
release of GMOs is essential for an international agreement for
deliberate release regulations. 296 Besides the world leaders in
biotechnology, such as the United States, Japan, and the EC,
level playing field" for companies marketing genetically engineered products and
processes).
291. Id. at 437.
292. Id.
293. See Weiss, supra note 245, at 687 (stating that international environmental
agreements must have sufficient flexibility to allow parties to adapt to changes in
scientific understanding and technological advances); see also GIBBs, supra note 10, at
276 (advocating flexibility in international biotechnology regulations).
294. See Weiss, supra note 245, at 688 (discussing movement in international
environmental law away from traditional treaty amendment procedures that were too
cumbersome to address rapid scientific advances).
295. See New Environmental Debate Expected as U.N. Convenes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1992, at AIO L (announcing creation of U.N. "Sustainable Development Commis-
sion" to hear and assess criticism of governmental treatment of environment); see also
Yuan interview, supra note 252 (suggesting that international body similar to Intellec-
tual Property Convention in Geneva may also be appropriate).
296. See Weiss, supra note 245, at 691 ("Because the global environmental sys-
tem ignores political boundaries, it is important for countries that have an impact on
the global environment not to remain outside the convention system and defeat the
purposes of the agreement."); supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing
transboundary nature of microorganisms).
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the international agreement should also include developing
nations.
The representatives to the international regulatory body
should be composed of scientists or administrators with exper-
tise in risk assessment. 97 A qualified body with expertise in
assessing the risk of the new biotechnology product would be
better able to make an objective analysis of the GMO product
than a politically elected party.2 98 A single international gov-
erning body would be best suited to respond to the rapid pace
of biotechnological developments that can quickly make any
regulation for deliberate releases obsolete.299
The regulatory body should be responsible for granting
approval for deliberate releases. Each representative should
have one vote to approve a proposed deliberate release.300 Pe-
riodic meetings of the representatives should be held to re-
spond to new scientific developments.3 0 '
Similar to applicable EC directives, the procedure for ob-
taining consent from the regulatory body should begin with
notification to the international regulatory body by the respon-
sible party prior to the proposed deliberate release.30 2 Notifi-
297. See Scott Deatherage, Note, Scientific Uncertainty in Regulating Deliberate Re-
lease of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Substantive Judicial Review and Institutional Alter-
natives, 11 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 203, 239-45 (1987) (proposing scientific advisory
committee similar to U.S. NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee to oversee
deliberate releases in U.S.); see also Weiss, supra note 245, at 693 (stating that
although nongovernmental organizations have assumed an increasingly important
role in international environmental agreements, there is not yet widespread accept-
ance of the practice nor any systemic pattern of representation).
298. See Tiedje, supra note 35, at 307 (recommending objective, scientific crite-
ria for regulatory oversight of deliberate releases of GMOs).
299. But see Barton letter, supra note 154, at 1-2. An alternative approach is one
in which national regulators can harmonize their requirements and test standards so
that one application package (with its supporting experimental data) can be used in
each of many nations. Id. This method gives many of the benefits of full decision-
making while providing respect for a relatively sensitive area of national sovereignty.
Id.
300. See generally Peter H. Sand, UNCED and the Development of International Envi-
ronmental Law, 3 Y.B. Irr'L. ENVrL. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16-18, available in
WESTLAW, TP-AUI) (discussing bi-polarization between developed and developing
nations at Earth Summit).
301. See Weiss, supra note 245, at 688 (citing procedures of Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete Ozone Layer in which parties can agree to reduce con-
sumption of listed chemicals faster and further than provided in text without having
to use formal and time consuming amendment procedures).
302. See Council Directive 90/220, art 12, 1990 O.J. (L 117) at 19 (requiring
1204 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL L,4 WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1160
cation should be accompanied by a product characterization,
which entails identifying the source of the genetic modification
that should be included in the notification. 0 3 Because re-
vealing the source of the modification may conflict with trade
secrecy, the information about the GMO product would be
given to the international body on a confidential basis. 3°
Notification to this qualified body should also include an
evaluation of the risks associated with the genetically modified
product.30 5 An adequate risk assessment must provide esti-
mates of the probability that particular health and environmen-
tal consequences will occur.30 6 Important factors to include
are the GMO's potential for possible harmful effects on
humans or the environment and its ability to survive and
reproduce in hostile environments.30 7 The latter factor will
alert nations to potential transboundary problems.3 0 8
Although risk assessments were previously determined on
a case-by-case basis, the publication of the OECD's 1992 Re-
port and the passage of the German Genetic Technology Law
shows that there is now sufficient data to begin formulating a
standardized risk assessment for proposed deliberate releases
notification for deliberate releases of GMO products be sent to Council of the Euro-
pean Community) Contra Heinemeyer, supra note 159, at 351 (stating that notification
requirements are often ineffective in regulatory frameworks).
303. See id. art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 117) at 17 (setting forth the requirements for
product characterization); see also McGarity, supra note 1 (proposing product charac-
terization as component of risk analysis for GMOs released in environment).
304. See Council Directive 90/220, art 19, 1990 O.J. (L 117) at 4 (providing for
confidentiality of trade secrets); see also supra note 217 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Directive 90/220's protection of trade secrets); BIA on GMO Regulations, Bi-
OTECH. Bus. NEWS, Oct. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File
(quoting representative of BioIndustry Association of UK stating that disclosure of
information is seen as damaging to commercial interests and to future patent rights);
EEC Biotech Directives Approved Formally, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, Apr. 27, 1990,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (stating concern of British pharma-
ceutical industry about impact of data disclosure requirements of EC directives).
305. See McGarity, supra note 1, at 439 (proposing that risk assessment should
be divided into four categories: product characterization, hazard assessment, expo-
sure assessment, and risk prediction); see also Council Directive No. 90/220, 1990 O.J.
(L 117) (providing for notification to Member States in advance of deliberate re-
leases).
306. See McGarity, supra note 1, at 439 (discussing components of risk assess-
ment for deliberate releases).
307. Id.
308. Id.
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of GMOS. °9 Factors of risk can now be quantified at least'ac-
cording to low, medium, and high classifications.3 1 0  Rather
than using the EC's practice of assessing risk on a case-by-case-
basis, the proposed international regulatory scheme should as-
sign values as practiced in Germany and as proposed by the
OECD.s1 t
The determination of a low-risk deliberate release should
be made on the basis of previous field tests and other available
data. For low-risk or small-scale field tests, the party responsi-
ble for the release should be required only to notify the inter-
national regulatory body. i2 In contrast, express consent from
the regulatory body should be required for deliberate releases
of commercial GMO products, such as large-scale field tests,
and higher risk field tests. For example, the field testing of
pathogenic microorganisms capable of infecting indigenous
crops, such as the field test of the tobacco blue mold, would
require express approval from the regulatory body. 13 A delib-
erate release of genetically modified Rhizobium, which has
been used for several years, should be classified as a low risk
field test and allowed to proceed as long as the party propos-
ing the release notifies the international regulatory body. 14
The high cost of meeting regulatory requirements in-
creases the cost of developing new products.3 5 The expense
309. See 1992 REPORT, supra note 12, at 28-29 (discussing working assumptions
for GDP); see also Gentechnikgesetz, supra note 73, § 7, 1990 BGBI. I at 1083 (setting
safety levels for deliberate release of GMOS).
310. See Gentechnikgesetz, supra note 73, § 7, 1990 BGBI. I at 1080 (setting
safety levels 1-4 for deliberate releases); see also 1992 REPORT, supra note 12, at 28
(proposing GDP for small-scale field testing GMOs); McGarity, supra note 1, at 444
(suggesting broad categories of "low", "medium" and "high" for assessing risk of
deliberate releases).
311. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (stating German regulations use
levels 1-4 in assessing risk of GMO); supra notes 186-94 and accompany text (discuss-
ing OECD's latest proposal to apply GDP to determine low risk field testing of
GMOs).
312. But see Heinemeyer, supra note 159, at 351 (suggesting that notification re-
quirements are often ineffective).
313. See supra note 46 (discussing spread of tobacco blue mold across national
boundaries).
314. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Rhizobium).
315. See Aldhous, supra note 13 (discussing cost of regulatory compliance); Con-
roy, supra note 104 (applying for permit in U.S. costs average of US$5,000 and per-
mit approval process may take up to four months); supra note 102 and accompanying
text (discussing cost of compliance with new British regulations).
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of developing new products then encourages industry to con-
centrate on commercially lucrative products rather than prod-
ucts whose commercial potential is relatively small or research
the environmental impact of GMOs.31 6 Eliminating express
approval for.low-risk field tests would reduce the cost of devel-
oping GMO products and partially alleviate the pressure on
industry to develop commercial products that can justify the
cost of development.
Once approval has been received from an international
governing body, it should not be necessary to apply for ap-
proval in an individual country. Only if the receiving country
can establish a specific danger or need for proof of safety par-
ticular to the receiving country would a separate approval be
required to export products into that particular country. 17
The notification requirement is a burden on the party propos-
ing the deliberate release to show proof of safety to the envi-
ronment. Where a country objects to admitting a GMO prod-
uct, the burden of proof initially placed on the party proposing
the deliberate release would then shift to the objecting country
to show valid grounds for refusing admission. 3 " The shift in
the burden of proof should act as a restraint on veto power so
that countries cannot abuse their option to restrict the pro-
posed deliberate release or GMO product.3 9 But a majority
vote by the regulatory body should override a single country's
objections.320
In addition, some provision for public hearings should be
316. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting research concentrates on
lucrative areas); OTA, supra note 1, at 186 (stating that regulatory agency require-
ments discourage research on subjects with little potential for commercial reward);
McGarity, supra note 1, at 445 (stating that enormous cost of internationalizing bio-
technology could be unfortunate for beneficiaries of biotechnologies with small mar-
kets that would not warrant cost of complying with importing countries' additional
risk assessment requirements).
317. See Council Directive 90/220, art. 16(1), 1990 OJ. (L 117) at 20 (allowing
Member States to restrict sale of GMO product). But see Daniel G. Partan, Note,
International Administrative Law, 75 AM.J. INT'L L. 639, 642 (1981) (discussing contro-
versy over Codex Alimentarius Commission's procedures which allow countries to
exclude products that do not conform to its "minor deviations").
318. See FROM RESEARCH TO REVOLUTION, supra note 104, at 111 (discussing bur-
den of proof in regulatory schemes). "The burden of proof is probably the most
important choice of all . . . a stringent regulatory framework is one in which the
burden of proof is on the outside party seeking approval." Id.
319. See id. (discussing burden of proof in regulating environmental releases).
320. See supra note 227 (discussing EC Directive 90/220, which allows majority
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included in the approval process to give the public a chance to
express their reservations. While regulatory decisions
should not reject sound science to allay public fears, 22 the
public should nevertheless have an opportunity to present
their objections.3 23 A sound regulatory process must success-
fully balance the competing objectives of maintaining public
confidence in the regulatory process and basing regulatory de-
cisions on reasonable scientific grounds.3 24
CONCLUSION
Because genetically modified organisms can cross national
boundaries, international harmonization is needed to protect
against the potential hazards of deliberate releases. But while
guarding against potential harms, an international regulatory
scheme should also foster industrial activity, promote the flow
of trade, and encourage research into the field. Besides facili-
tating trade for more developed countries, an international
agreement would also serve to protect developing nations that
do not have the resources to institute regulation of deliberate
releases. The harmonization of regulations for deliberate re-
leases should occur now, before the biotechnology industry
has fully matured.
Judy . Kim*
vote of committee of representatives of Member States to overcome objection by one
Member State).
321. See supra note 79 (discussing German Genetic Technology Law's provision
for public hearings); Council Directive No. 90/220, art. 7, OJ. (L 117) at 18 (provid-
ing for public participation in regulation of deliberate release of GMOs).
322. Id
323. Biotechnology: Industrialists Demand Support From Politicians, EUR. REP. Nov.
28, 190 at 5, available in LEXIS, Nexis, OMNI File (suggesting that solution is not to
give scientists carte blanche but to permit public to give its opinion based on specific
information about risks of new GMO product).
324. GIBBs, supra note 10, at 270. U.S. politicians and industry have agreed that
public support is important. Id. Public support is vital in this area because public
opposition can lead to litigation. See Tiedje, supra note 35, at 299 (stating that devel-
opment of environmentally sound products through use of advanced biotechnology
should occur within context of scientifically based regulatory policy that encourages
innovation without compromising sound environmental management); supra note 20
and accompanying text (discussing litigation over deliberate release of genetically
modified bacteria).
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